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INTRODUCTION 
Quietly reading a book by a window in your apartment isn’t 
necessarily a “private” act. Many living in densely packed loca-
tions like Manhattan inevitably wonder whether eyes peering 
through telescopes or watching digital camera screens find them, 
linger for a time, capture images or generate fantasies about who 
and what they are.1 That appropriation reality popped into public 
view in 2013 when Martha and Matthew Foster discovered images 
of themselves and their children, Delaney and James, in Arne 
Svenson’s photography exhibition The Neighbors mounted at the 
Julie Saul Gallery in the Chelsea district of Manhattan.2 The Fos-
ters lived in a modern glass walled building—The Zinc—in north-
ern TriBeCa.3 Arne Svenson lived across the street in a second 
                                                                                                                            
1 As a resident of a fourteenth floor apartment across Broadway from two large 
residential buildings to the east, such thoughts certainly cross my mind. 
2 The gallery is located at 535 West 22nd Street. A book of photos from the exhibition 
was recently released. ARNE SVENSON, THE NEIGHBORS (2015) (indicating that the 
pictures will be shown at the Museum of Contemporary Art Denver in 2016). For 
pictures displayed in the show, see The Neighbors, JULIE SAUL GALLERY, 
http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-svenson/neighbors [http://perma.cc/L5AJ-LS
DN] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). A number of stories about the show have been 
published. See, e.g., Ellen Gamermon, The Fine Art of Spying, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2013, 
8:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873240947045790651
23679605360 [http://perma.cc/AN8L-EC2W]; Barbara Pollack, When Does Surveillance 
Cross the Line, ARTNEWS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.artnews.com/2014/09/09/
privacy-and-surveillance-art [http://perma.cc/ZBD2-RMYZ]. 
3 See Pollack, supra note 2. TriBeCa (local parlance for “triangle below Canal Street,” 
even though the neighborhood’s shape is a trapezoid) is located in the southwest part of 
Manhattan just north of the Financial District. Much of it is now designated and 
controlled as historic. It is filled with old industrial loft buildings that have become some 
of the poshest apartments in the city. The Zinc is one of a number of recently constructed 
buildings erected on empty or non-historic parcels. 
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floor loft at 125 Watts Street.4★ He used a telephoto lens equipped 
digital camera to take pictures of the Fosters and others living in 
The Zinc while staying in the shadows of his own abode.5 The Fos-
ters sued Svenson and the Julie Saul Gallery, making privacy and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.6 They sought 
damages and an injunction requiring removal of two pictures of 
their family from public and electronic display.7 “According to the 
Fosters,” Barbara Pollack wrote in ARTnews, “Svenson is nothing 
more than a Peeping Tom, invading their privacy and exploiting 
their profiles for commercial gain.”8 The Fosters lost their motion 
for preliminary relief in the trial court, a result recently affirmed on 
appeal.9 
                                                                                                                            
4★ Amanda Gorence, Arne Svenson Takes a Voyeuristic Look Inside the Apartments of His 
Tribeca Neighbors, FEATURE SHOOT (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.featureshoot.com/
2013/04/arne-svenson-takes-a-voyeuristic-look-inside-the-apartments-of-his-tribeca-
neighbors [http://perma.cc/DJF8-YXTP]. For an image of the buildings, see Richard H. 
Chused, The Zinc Building and Svenson’s Loft, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, 
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments01.html [http://perma.cc/JW6S-2T8V] (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
5 See Gorence, supra note 4. 
6 The emotional distress claim did not play much of a role in the first round of 
proceedings. The Fosters alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress as a cause of 
action in their complaint, dated May 20, 2013, as a result of the photographing and 
subsequent promotion of images of their children. See Complaint at 7–8, Foster v. 
Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013). In the 
Memorandum the Fosters filed in support of their motion to enjoin Svenson’s actions, 
they argued that Svenson violated various New York civil and criminal statutes, but they 
did not mention the emotional distress claim. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6–11, 
Foster, 2013 WL 3989038 (No. 651826/2013). They mentioned statutes barring unlawful 
surveillance (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45(1), (3) (McKinney 2014)); child endangerment 
(PENAL § 260.10(1)); and violation of publicity rights (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 
(McKinney 2014)). See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra, at 1, 6–7. The 
defendant’s response, filed in early June, paid scant attention to the emotional distress 
claim. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss and in 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19–22, Foster, 2013 WL 
3989038 (No. 651826/2013). That makes sense. There is scant, if any, evidence that the 
level of intentionality and grievous emotional impact required to win this sort of tort claim 
was present. This Article deals only with the privacy issues. 
7 See sources cited supra note 6. 
8 Pollack, supra note 2. 
9 See Foster, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013), 
aff’d, 128 A.D.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
106 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:103 
 
Most of the pictures in The Neighbors exhibition are, at least in 
the eyes of this viewer, aesthetically pleasing.10 The emotional res-
ponses of some of those in Svenson’s photographs, however, were 
understandably testy. The Fosters were not the only upset resi-
dents. Mariel Kravetz, also a resident of The Zinc, invited Jennifer 
Bain, a New York Post reporter, to come to her apartment in The 
Zinc building to snap pictures of Svenson’s abode across the 
street.11 Though Svenson was not visible during the photo shoot, a 
medical model in his window was.12★ A photo taken during Bain’s 
visit later appeared in the newspaper. She reported that Kravetz 
found the effort to be sweet revenge because Kravetz was “horri-
fied” to find out that she appeared in two displayed photos in 
Svenson’s show. Kravetz was also concerned he took more pic-
tures of daughter: “‘What does he have that we haven’t seen?’ 
Kravetz asked Bain. ‘He probably took thousands or more. I have a 
young daughter. It’s more than me. Does he have any of her? 
That’s my biggest concern.’”13 
Svenson’s explanation of his actions—framed from a perspec-
tive denying the authenticity of any privacy claims—may have 
stoked the anger and anxiety of the Fosters and Kravetz. In a blog 
about The Neighbors exhibit published shortly before the show 
opened, he was quoted as saying: 
                                                                                                                            
10 I include in the aesthetically pleasing category the two images picturing members of 
the Foster family. 
11 See Jennifer Bain, A Sneak Peek into Tribeca Peeping Photographer’s Apartment, N.Y. 
POST (May 23, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/05/23/a-sneak-peek-into-tri
beca-peeping-photographers-apartment [http://perma.cc/2Z6K-8EDU]. 
12★ Serendipitously, before either the photograph controversy or Bain’s visit to 
Kravetz’s apartment, the interior of Svenson’s apartment was featured in a New York 
Times article about interior design. Joyce Wadler, Inviting in the Ghosts, N.Y. TIMES: ON 
LOCATION, Dec. 5, 2012, at D6. The model was still in the window when I walked by on 
March 16, 2015. A picture I took is available at Svenson’s Loft, APPROPRIATE(D) 
MOMENTS, www.rhchused.com/Moments02.html [http://perma.cc/6JP3-WKY9] (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015), next to a picture that originally appeared in an online slideshow 
that accompanies Wadler’s article, Trevor Tondro, Lions and Tigers and Bears, Oh My, 
N.Y. TIMES: ON LOCATION, http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2012/12/06/great
homesanddestinations/20121206-LOCATION.html [http://perma.cc/3KC3-CDPQ] 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
13 Bain, supra note 11. During the trial court proceedings, Svenson indicated that he 
may have had about fifty pictures of the Foster apartment, though it later turned out that 
probably was an overestimate. 
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For my subjects there is no question of privacy; they 
are performing behind a transparent scrim on a 
stage of their own creation with the curtain raised 
high. The Neighbors don’t know they are being pho-
tographed; I carefully shoot from the shadows of my 
home into theirs. I am not unlike the birder, quietly 
waiting for hours, watching for the flutter of a hand 
or the movement of a curtain as an indication that 
there is life within.14 
The consequences of the dispute may be visible on-site. When I 
walked by the buildings on the afternoon of March 16, 2015, most 
of the window shades and curtains were drawn in the apartments 
facing Svenson’s. A peek at a Google Street View image of the 
same site in June, 2011, however, shows that many of the windows 
were uncovered.15 Whether that is a result of Svenson’s actions is 
impossible to know without speaking to the residents.16★ But it 
would hardly be surprising that some residents would respond by 
hiding themselves behind window coverings.17 
                                                                                                                            
14 Gorence, supra note 4. In a later interview after the litigation was filed, Svenson gave 
a similar, though somewhat less intrusive explanation, for his actions: 
I shot for the tiny nuances of gesture and posture that define who we 
are, collectively. The subjects are to be seen as representations of 
humankind, non-identifiable as the actual people photographed. I was 
also intrigued by the way light struck the building/glass, how it 
diffused and flattened the subjects within, giving the photographs a 
unique palette and an almost painterly presence. 
Ken Weingart, An Interview with Photographer Arne Svenson, PETAPIXEL (Mar. 16, 2015), 
http://petapixel.com/2015/03/16/interview-with-photographer-arne-svenson 
[http://perma.cc/TP5J-SS2Q]. 
15 GOOGLE MAPS, http://www.maps.google.com (search “125 Watts Street, New 
York, NY” (Svenson’s apartment) in the search bar, enter “Street View,” navigate 
screen to look across the street at The Zinc building, then click the clock icon and select 
“June 2011”) [http://perma.cc/3QK7-PCQ4] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015]). 
16★ I have not been successful in obtaining interviews with anyone. An image with most 
of the shades down on the lower floors of the Zinc Building is available at Richard H. 
Chused, Zinc Apartment Shades Down, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, 
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments03.html [http://perma.cc/V5NV-ZEFF] (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
17 If that is happening it is a bit ironic, for some of the larger units in The Zinc are quite 
expensive. It is difficult to imagine that someone spending a large sum for a bright, airy 
apartment would be pleased when “forced” to lower their shades. According to 
StreetEasy, a two-bedroom, 1,675 square-foot apartment sold for $3,180,000 in January, 
2015. The Zinc Building at 475 Greenwich Street, STREETEASY, http://streeteasy.com/
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This dispute raises a host of difficult social, cultural, and legal 
questions. All of the many friends and colleagues I chatted with 
about the Svenson exhibition expressed some form of anxiety, 
creepiness, or worry. But they also had difficulty articulating the 
basis for their concern. Some worried about the intrusive nature of 
such photography only to opine that it wasn’t very different from 
being on a street or in a subway when a professional camera wielder 
clicks off shots for a coming gallery show. Others wondered why 
their likenesses should be the source of funds to an artist before 
commenting that professional photographers must have a great 
deal of leeway in picking their subjects and deciding what to public-
ly display. Many wanted to know if the pictures revealed moments 
of sexual intimacy or nudity. When I said they did not18 and added 
my opinion that many of them were quite beautiful, the reaction 
often was, “hmmmmmm . . . .” A few articulated feelings of cree-
piness only to partially retract them by opining that New Yorkers 
expect to be watched in their apartments by all types of eyes when 
their shades are up or their curtains are open. In short, puzzlement 
and consternation were routine. This Article is a preliminary effort 
to unravel some of the perplexity. It is only fair to say at the outset, 
however, that firm, bright line resolutions are difficult to discern. 
I begin with an historical journey. The first stop is the famous 
Warren and Brandeis article, The Right to Privacy, published a cen-
tury and a quarter ago in the Harvard Law Review.19 The authors 
complained about the ways photographers and newspaper report-
ers “invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life” and 
                                                                                                                            
building/the-zinc-building#tab_building_detail=2 [http://perma.cc/9SNK-5UTF] (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
18 Though, other forms of intimacy are visible. In one picture, what appear to be a man 
and woman sit across from each other with their legs on the same footrest. SVENSON, 
supra note 2, at Neighbors #1. They are dressed in robes and the lower parts of their legs 
(but no upper bodies or faces) are displayed. In another, an obviously pregnant woman 
sits on the back of a sofa, again without her face showing. SVENSON, supra note 2, at 
Neighbors #8. A third shows the clothed rear end of what appears to be a woman, 
apparently cleaning a floor. SVENSON, supra note 2, at Neighbors #5. In one of the 
pictures the Fosters complained about, Martha is holding her son upside down. His face 
is right in front of the Foster’s daughter who is dressed in a child’s swimsuit. Many 
others also display intimate, wholly non-sexual, moments. 
19 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
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overstepped “the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.”20 
The distant echoes of Warren and Brandeis’ lament resound in the 
protests made by Kravetz and the Fosters to Svenson’s The Neigh-
bors exhibition. But almost one hundred twenty-five years passed 
between the publication of The Right to Privacy and the mounting of 
The Neighbors. Any inquiry into the legal cogency of the Foster 
claims therefore must venture into the ways photographic technol-
ogy, artistic trends, and cultural changes have influenced the crea-
tive presentation of moments “appropriated” from the lives of 
strangers. That is the second stop in this Article’s journey. I con-
clude in the third and final part by using the historical inquiries as a 
baseline for thinking about the ways legal norms changed over the 
course of the last one hundred and twenty five years and for medi-
tating on the wisdom of changing those norms again. 
I. WARREN AND BRANDEIS 
The famous Warren and Brandeis21★ article is a fascinating 
document. The literature on the piece is enormous and continues 
to appear.22 In some ways, that is very difficult to explain. For the 
piece is a time warp. A careful reading today should produce a 
“what’s the big deal” reaction from most readers. It may best be 
described as a screed against media gossip—the seemingly insatia-
                                                                                                                            
20 Id. at 195–96. 
21★ Images of Warren and Brandeis may be found at Richard H. Chused, Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/
Moments04.html [http://perma.cc/XYF6-W7SZ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
22 A small sample of some of the more interesting work discussing the article includes: 
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY 
OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010); DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS 
MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1972); DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 
(2008); James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis: The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 
(1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875 (1979); Benjamin E. 
Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s “The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right to 
Privacy,” 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002); Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t 
Married a Senator’s Daughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage That Led to “The Right to 
Privacy,” 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35 (2007); Dorothy Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss 
M, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 401 (1989); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 
(1960); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy at 50: A Mixed Legacy, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010). 
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ble desire of the press to disturb “propriety and . . . decency”23 by 
parading the lives and peccadilloes of others before the general 
public. The authors’ dyspepsia with newspaper gossip columns 
would be met by most today with a shrug. On the other hand, the 
article is an intriguing signal about the sorts of social and cultural 
dynamics that can produce disarray in theories of privacy. The 
combination of forces that led to the article’s penning mirror simi-
lar forces at work today—the rapid spread of new forms of media, 
cultural fascination with the rich and famous, and the invention of 
new and potentially intrusive technologies allowing for much 
broader appropriation of moments in the daily lives of unsuspecting 
or publicly prominent citizens. Taking a brief look at these two, di-
chotomous, views of the famous work of Warren and Brandeis will 
set the stage for a broader look at the social, cultural and technolo-
gical developments that made the present-day dispute between the 
Fosters and Svenson possible. 
A. Time Warp 
Warren and Brandeis used strong words to condemn the im-
pact of gossip on society. 
The press is overstepping in every direction the ob-
vious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is 
no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, 
but has become a trade, which is pursued with in-
dustry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient 
taste the details of sexual relations are spread broad-
cast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy 
the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle 
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion 
upon the domestic circle. The intensity and com-
plexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, 
have rendered necessary some retreat from the 
world, and man, under the refining influence of cul-
ture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that 
solitude and privacy have become more essential to 
the individual; but modern enterprise and invention 
                                                                                                                            
23 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 196. 
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have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected 
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than 
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. Nor is the 
harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suf-
fering of those who may be made the subjects of 
journalistic or other enterprise. In this, as in other 
branches of commerce, the supply creates the de-
mand.24 Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus har-
vested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct 
proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of 
social standards and of morality. Even gossip appar-
ently harmless, when widely and persistently circu-
lated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and per-
verts. It belittles by inverting the relative impor-
tance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspi-
rations of a people. When personal gossip attains 
the dignity of print, and crowds the space available 
for matters of real interest to the community, what 
wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its 
relative importance. Easy of comprehension, ap-
pealing to that weak side of human nature which is 
never wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frail-
ties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it 
usurps the place of interest in brains capable of oth-
er things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of 
thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can 
                                                                                                                            
24 My colleague, Ed Purcell, noted to me after reading a draft of this Article that there 
was some irony in this adoption by Warren and Brandeis of the highly controversial, 
traditional Say’s Law, stated more fully in JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, A TREATISE ON POLITICAL 
ECONOMY; OR THE PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH 134–35 
(Clement C. Biddle ed., C. R. Prinsep trans., 6th ed. 1855) (“It is worth while to remark 
that a product is no sooner created than it, from that instant, affords a market for other 
products to the full extent of its own value. When the producer has put the finishing hand 
to his product, he is most anxious to sell it immediately, lest its value should diminish in 
his hands. Nor is he less anxious to dispose of the money he may get for it; for the value of 
money is also perishable. But the only way of getting rid of money is in the purchase of 
some product or other. Thus, the mere circumstance of creation of one product 
immediately opens a vent for other products.”). 
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flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its 
blighting influence.25 
For some time, much of the writing about the Harvard article 
remained fairly constant—continuing speculation about what led 
the authors to write it, rather than analysis of the distressing influ-
ence of gossip. It certainly is true that disparaging others can be 
destructive. The concept of lashon hara ( ה ןושלער , literally bad or evil 
tongue) in Jewish theology attempts to counter the cultural tenden-
cy to speak about others in ways that may be harmful even if true. 
A wonderful Chasidic tale describes a young man who regularly 
gossiped about others. Feeling remorseful he went to speak with a 
rabbi about atoning for his deeds. The rabbi told him to get a pil-
low, cut it open, and let the feathers scatter in the breeze. Though 
he thought the request odd, he did as he was told. When he re-
turned to the rabbi to tell him he had completed the task, the rabbi 
told him to go retrieve the feathers. His efforts to do so, of course, 
failed. When he returned to the rabbi and admitted his inability to 
start, let alone complete, retrieving the feathers, he was told “your 
words are like the feathers. Once they leave your mouth, you can 
never get them back again.”26 
But even if displeasure with gossipy media may sometimes be 
warranted, it was difficult to understand why Warren and Brandies 
were so distressed. It was not clear that newspapers printed any-
thing about either of them in the years before the article appeared 
that warranted their wrath. The standard account for many years 
was William Prosser’s 1960 statement that Samuel Warren, Louis 
Brandeis’ law partner when the article was written, was piqued by 
media coverage of his daughter’s marriage.27 That idea was de-
bunked after a bit of genealogical research demonstrated that War-
ren could not have had a daughter of marriageable age by the time 
the Harvard article was published.28 Given the problems with 
                                                                                                                            
25 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 196. 
26 Shoshannah Brombacher, A Pillow Full of Feathers, CHABAD, http://www.chabad.org
/library/article_cdo/aid/812861/jewish/A-Pillow-Full-of-Feathers.htm [http://perma.cc
/KN7P-4KWU] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) (containing a more complete telling of this 
wonderful story). 
27 See Prosser, supra note 22, at 423. 
28 See Barron, supra note 22, at 892–93. 
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Prosser’s theory and the failure of scholars to find much 1880s 
press coverage of Warren, Brandeis, or their families, there was 
little to go on. In the early 1970s, Don Pember managed to find 
some support for the pique in correspondence between Warren and 
Brandeis and in the memories of descendants of Warren.29 Both 
letters and interviews confirmed his aggravation with the media.30 
With the publication of Barron’s article on the history of The Right 
of Privacy in 197931 and of Amy Gajda’s meticulously researched 
2007 essay describing the gossipy media coverage of Samuel War-
ren and his family during the 1880s, it became possible to more ful-
ly explain the origins of the article.32 Gajda discovered that Warren 
and his family were mentioned fairly often after his marriage to 
Mabel Bayard—the daughter of Senator Thomas F. Bayard of De-
laware—in early 1883.33 It now is generally accepted that Warren 
was upset at the operation of the press and was the prime mover 
behind the Harvard piece.34 
But that hardly justifies the wide attention the article has conti-
nuously garnered. While gossip often is unattractive, undignified, 
sensationalized, and silly, and sometimes decidedly harmful, the 
contemporary market for it is intense and cultural tolerance of its 
distribution is quite high. Surely current media freedom norms 
moot most, if not all, of the behavior Warren and Brandeis decried. 
                                                                                                                            
29 See PEMBER, supra note 22, at 24–25. 
30 Pember described Brandeis’ recollections of Warren’s “abhorrence” of privacy 
invasions by the press and of the memories of Warren’s dislike of gossip columns 
described by his grandson. Id. 
31 Barron, supra note 22. 
32 Gajda, supra note 22, at 37–40. Gajda’s summary of the prior literature on the 
problem also is very meticulous. She writes about Prosser’s error, the prior literature, and 
the uncertainty about Warren’s relationship with the press of the items. Id. Some of the 
items Gajda referred to were previously revealed by Barron, supra note 22, at 893–94, 
902–07. One of the examples described by Gajda was about coverage of Mrs. Warren’s 
friendship with Frances Folsom, the quite young wife of President Grover Cleveland. 
Folsom was the daughter of the Secretary of State, an ex-law partner of Cleveland. They 
had known each other since she was a young child. Their relationship was confirmed 
when she was only eighteen years old, twenty-eight years his junior. See Gajda, supra note 
22, at 51–53. 
33 Gajda, supra note 22, at 36 (explaining that the article examines approximately sixty 
newspaper stories from Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C. that reported on the 
personal lives of Warren and his family). 
34 See id. at 37 & n.8. 
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Theirs was not dyspepsia about distribution of false information, 
highly disparaging remarks, deeply intrusive fact gathering tech-
niques, or profoundly unflattering and insulting observations—
grounds that might support defamation, emotional distress, or pri-
vacy tort claims today. They simply did not want others to control 
discourse about them.35 Though the newspaper coverage Barron 
and Gajda discovered is considered tame today—gossip columns 
about visits by or with family and friends, dinner parties, marriages, 
dress habits, and funerals—it is clear that the articles got under the 
skins of the Harvard authors.36 
Though the core of their claim involved antipathy to forms of 
gossip that would hardly cause a ripple today, they also couched 
their argument in somewhat broader prose that, when carefully 
analyzed, might support what we now call a right to publicity. 
Recent inventions and business methods call atten-
tion to the next step which must be taken for the 
protection of the person, and for securing to the in-
dividual what Judge Cooley calls the right “to be let 
alone.” Instantaneous photographs and newspaper 
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of pri-
vate and domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devices threaten to make good the prediction that 
“what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed 
from the house-tops.” For years there has been a 
feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the 
unauthorized circulation of portraits of private per-
sons; and the evil of the invasion of privacy by the 
newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but recently 
discussed by an able writer. The alleged facts of a 
somewhat notorious case brought before an interior 
tribunal in New York a few months ago, directly in-
volved the consideration of the right of circulating 
                                                                                                                            
35 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 196. 
36 See Barron, supra note 22, at 914–28. Barron strongly drives this notion home. 
Claiming that Warren and Brandeis were patrician sorts, deeply uncomfortable with 
burgeoning economic shifts and quickly urbanizing American culture, he argues that the 
article reflects much more about their desire to define the nature of “proper” journalism 
than to protect their personal privacy. Id. 
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portraits; and the question whether our law will rec-
ognize and protect the right to privacy in this and in 
other respects must soon come before our courts for 
consideration.37 
The footnoted sources referenced by Warren and Brandeis in 
this brief, but important, excerpt provided remarkably thin, if any, 
support for their gossip claims, but they revealed a great deal about 
the authors to us. All, save the reference to Cooley’s treatise,38 
dealt with the roles of newspapers, gossip, and—of particular im-
portance for this Article—photography in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Two involved newspaper reports of threatened 
or pending litigation.39 The other three were brief essays with ref-
erences to some aspect of privacy.40 The two court cases41 are fas-
                                                                                                                            
37 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 195–96 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY 
ON TORTS 29 (2d ed., 1880); Joseph A. Jameson, The Legal Relations of Photographs, 8 AM. 
L. REG. (n.s.) 1 (1869); George B. Corkhill, Editorial, Portrait Right, 12 WASH. L. REP. 353 
(June 7, 1884); Watkin Williams, Letter to the Editor, The Sale of Photographic Portraits, 
24 SOLIC. J. & REP. 4–5 (1879); E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: To His Reputation, 8 
SCRIBNER’S MAG. 65, 67 (July 1890); Marion Manola v. Stevens & Myers, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 18, 21, 1890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890)). The authors’ reference to the Manola case 
added, 
[T]he complainant alleged that while she was playing Broadway 
Theatre, in a role which required her appearance in tights, she was, by 
means of a flash light, photographed surreptitiously and without her 
consent, from one of the boxes, by defendant Myers, a photographer, 
and prayed that the defendants might be restrained from making use 
of the photograph taken. A preliminary injunction issued ex parte, and 
a time was set for argument of the motion that the injunction should 
be made permanent, but no one then appeared in opposition. 
Id. at 195 n.7. 
38 This reference by Warren and Brandeis points to an oft noted line from Cooley’s 
treatise discussing “Personal Immunity” stating, “The right to one’s person may be said 
to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone. The corresponding duty is, not to 
inflict an injury, and not, within such proximity as might render is successful, to attempt 
the infliction of an injury.” See COOLEY, supra note 37, at 29. While Warren and Brandeis 
obviously were intrigued by the phrase “right . . . to be let alone,” Cooley only discussed 
traditional rules of assault and battery in the section. It did not support any claim about 
personal privacy as we have to think of it. 
39 See Corkhill, supra note 37, at 353; Marion Manola, supra note 37. 
40 Jameson, supra note 37; Williams, supra note 37; Godkin, supra note 37. 
41 See infra notes 42–52 and accompanying text (discussing the legal action that 
followed the publication of stolen images of a few high-society women in Brooklyn) and 
notes 53–61 and accompanying text (discussing the legal conflict that occurred when a 
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cinating. Each presented settings in which some form of secretive 
use of photography and distribution of images led to objections 
from those in the pictures. 
The first, briefly summarized in the 1884 Washington Law Re-
porter editorial cited by Warren and Brandeis, involved contem-
plated suits 
[T]o enjoin the publication, commenced by one of 
the daily papers, of portraits of a number of ladies in 
society in Brooklyn, on the ground that they were, 
or are to be copied from photographs supposed to 
have been procured surreptitiously by the publisher, 
from the possession of a photographer who had tak-
en photographs of these ladies in the ordinary 
course of his business.42 
While admitting the existence of a copyright in the photo-
graphs, the editorial goes on to opine that the right of the subject of 
a photograph “to object to the reproduction of copies is quite 
another question” and that recognizing “the proprieties of life” 
required drawing a line between well known figures “deemed in 
some sense public property” and others retaining a right to object 
to “undesired publicity.”43 
The editorial referenced by Warren and Brandeis provided only 
scant information about the story, but a little digging produced the 
details. On June 1, 1884, the Sunday edition of the New York World 
published woodcut images of Brooklyn44 society women, along 
                                                                                                                            
photographer snapped a picture of actress Marion Manola in a revealing costume during a 
performance). 
42 Corkhill, supra note 37, at 353. 
43 Id. 
44 It’s worth noting that according to the 1880 census, Brooklyn was the third largest 
city in the United States with 566,663 people, following only New York and Philadelphia. 
1880 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/www/through_
the_decades/fast_facts/1880_fast_facts.html [https://perma.cc/GB4Z-6ZLC] (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2015). The boroughs were not merged to form New York City as we 
know it now until 1898. See Phillip Lopate, The Greatest Year: 1898, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 9, 
2011), http://nymag.com/news/features/greatest-new-york/70466 [https://perma.cc/
TBK8-6U92]. Brooklyn had all the cacophony, problems, highly competitive newspapers, 
and gossip of the late-nineteenth century. Today, it is the most populous of the five 
boroughs that make up New York City. Borough Trends & Insights, N.Y. ECON. DEV. 
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with some comments about them, over the headline “Brooklyn 
Belles.”45 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle reported that the “Belles” ar-
ticle “dealt very personally with wives and daughters of some of 
the most highly esteemed citizens of Brooklyn.”46 Members of the 
effected families expressed outrage at the events, though the com-
mentary was quite tame. Under a woodcut image of Miss May 
Whitbeck, for example, a brief paragraph described her as “stylish, 
attractive, free-hearted and a favorite upon her first entrance into 
the ball-room or reception parlor. At the banquet table she is par-
ticularly vivacious, and her wit flows like sparkling wine. She is one 
of the most fascinating girls in Brooklyn society.”47★ 
The images apparently were stolen from the photograph gallery 
of Alva Pearsall, turned over to the New York World, and used as a 
basis for making the woodcuts. Alva Pearsall was a well-known da-
guerreotype photographer with a thriving studio at the corner of 
Fulton and Flatbush Avenues.48★ His brother, Frank Pearsall, was 
an important cameramaker and inventor.49 The women whose im-
ages were taken from the gallery represented some elite Brooklyn 
                                                                                                                            
CORP., http://www.nycedc.com/resource/borough-trends-insights [http://perma.cc/26
GN-C7YY] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
45 The full headline was Brooklyn Belles, Ladies Who Grace and Adorn the Social Circle, 
N.Y. WORLD SUPPLEMENT, June 1, 1884, at 1. The story that unfolded in the press after 
the New York World article appeared, told as a tale of scandalous gossip, showed up in 
Local Belles: A Fierce Storm in Fourteen Brooklyn Families, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, June 4, 
1884, at 4; The Belles: Indignation Concerning the Stolen Photographs Unabated, BROOK. 
DAILY EAGLE, June 5, 1884, at 4; and an untitled note in The Independent, June 5, 1884, at 
18. 
46 Local Belles: A Fierce Storm in Fourteen Brooklyn Families, supra note 45, at 4. 
47★ The Whitbeck image and description may be seen at Richard H. Chused, “Brooklyn 
Belles” Article, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/
Moments05.html [http://perma.cc/SYK5-X264] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
48★ The details on Pearsall’s life, as well as a picture of his gallery on Fulton, are 
available at Alva Pearsall, HISTORIC CAMERA, http://historiccamera.com/cgi-bin/
librarium2/pm.cgi?action=app_display&app=datasheet&app_id=2027 [http://perma.cc/
MUV8-FXK7] (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). The gallery picture also is shown at Richard 
H. Chused, The Pearsall Gallery, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, 
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments06.html [http://perma.cc/B7XL-PPDT] (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
49 A compact, fold-up camera he developed in 1883 is pictured at Compact Camera, c. 
1883, ANTIQUE & 19TH CENTURY CAMERAS, http://www.antiquewoodcameras.com/
Pearsall-Camera.html [http://perma.cc/WN5B-RBX9] (last updated Sept. 28, 2015). 
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families.50 Pearsall, after being publicly chastised by an anonymous 
Daily Eagle letter writer “indignant at this outrage,”51 responded 
that he “would be a fit subject for a lunatic asylum to part with the 
photographs of my lady patrons for illustration in a paper and ex-
pect at the same time to keep their patronage.”52 Though the 
Washington Law Reporter editorial cited by Warren and Brandeis 
focused on the undesired gossip and publicity foisted upon the so-
ciety women of Brooklyn, one can surmise that a court would have 
sympathized with any effort to suppress the commercial use of pic-
tures obtained surreptitiously without the consent of either the 
photographer or the subjects. But, despite the gloss put on the tiff 
by the Washington Law Reporter and the other newspaper commen-
tators on the dispute, it was less a “privacy” dispute in modern 
terms than a kerfuffle about access to and control of flattering gos-
sip, as well as conversion and copyright ownership of pictures. 
The other case referenced by Warren and Brandeis—involving 
the famous singer and comic opera performer Marion Manola—
has been the subject of wide discussion, both during and after their 
era.53 While performing in Castles in the Air for the De Wolf Hop-
                                                                                                                            
50 They included the families of General A. C. Barnes, General James Jourdan, and Mr. 
John A. Nichols. Barnes, a veteran, was a prominent member of the National Guard and 
an important officer of the American Book Company, a large publishing house. See JAMES 
DE MANDEVILLE, HISTORY OF THE 13TH REGIMENT 175 (1894); Gen. A. C. Barnes Dead, 
THE SUN, Nov. 29, 1904, at 2; General A. C. Barnes, CORNELL DAILY SUN, Nov. 29, 1904, 
at 1. Jourdan also was involved in the military as the Colonel of the 13th Regiment, and 
served as the Police Commissioner of Brooklyn and head of the Brooklyn Gas Company. 
He was on the boards of other gas companies, as well as banks and railroads. General 
Jourdan Dies in 79th Year, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1910, at 11. Nichols was a prominent 
lawyer, a member of the Union League Club of New York and the Hamilton Club of 
Brooklyn, and an important personage in the Episcopal Church. 2 THE EAGLE AND 
BROOKLYN: THE RECORD OF THE PROGRESS OF THE BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE 1068 (Henry 
W.B. Howard & Arthur N. Jervis eds., 1893). 
51 A letter to the editor with this phrase and signed by “An Interested Party” appeared 
the day before Pearsall’s letter was published. Letter to the Editor, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, 
June 4, 1884, at 4. 
52 Alva Pearsall, Letter to the Editor, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, June 5, 1884, at 4. 
53 The best source by far is Dorothy Glancy’s article, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 
supra note 22. Glancy compares the stories of Marion Manola and Bette Midler, both 
famous singers and performers who brought publicity rights cases against those seeking to 
use aspects of their personalities for commercial purposes. As described in great and 
glorious detail by Glancy in her article, Manola objected to the use of a flash picture taken 
during one of her performances in advertisements for the play. Id. at 402–19. Midler won 
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per Company in 1890,54 a photographer snapped a picture of her 
from a box seat at the behest of those staging the performance. 
This probably was not done with a small device. Though some 
cameras were compact enough at that time to be concealed, the use 
of a bulky flash surely was both visible and clamorous. Manola 
stomped off the stage at the affront and filed an action seeking to 
bar use of the picture to advertise the show. The description of the 
events in the New York papers and the way they were used by 
Warren and Brandeis differed in subtle but important ways. Here is 
the brief report of the affair in the June 15, 1890 issue of the New 
York Times referred to by Warren and Brandeis: 
The alleged difficulty of the management of the 
De Wolf Opera Company in having its prima donna, 
Marion Manola, photographed in tights was over-
come at the Broadway Theatre last evening. A pho-
tographer was placed in one of the boxes, and when 
an opportunity occurred during the performance a 
flash light was used and a photograph of the actress 
was secured. 
When Miss Manola realized what had been done 
she threw her mantle over her face and ran off the 
stage. She returned, however, to finish her perfor-
mance. The photographer made no attempt to con-
ceal his presence in the box, but on the contrary, 
seemed to do all he could to attract the attention of 
the audience. In this he succeeded fully. 
It is alleged that Miss Manola refused to be pho-
tographed in tights owing to her modesty. The man-
agement, however, wanted such a photograph for li-
thograph purposes,55 and resorted to this device to 
                                                                                                                            
a famous case against Ford Motor Company for using one of her ex-backup singers to 
mimic her voice in TV ads for the Mercury Sable, first introduced to the market in 1985. 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849.F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); 1986 Mercury Sable TV 
Commercial, YOUTUBE (Mar. 4, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjIstCzsppA 
[http://perma.cc/2EQA-YA5H]. 
54 The musical comedy opened on May 5, 1890. It was performed 105 times and closed 
on August 16, 1890. GERALD MARTIN BORDMAN & RICHARD NORTON, AMERICAN 
MUSICAL THEATRE: A CHRONICLE 117 (4th ed. 2010). 
55 This was a common technique for making advertising copy. 
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obtain it. Who will say that the average theatre man-
ager does not know how to advertise his company?56 
It is reasonably clear from this little news item, as well as an ar-
ray of other circumstances, that Manola’s modesty was not the real 
issue. Other pictures of her in tights, including the 1890 Newsboy 
“cabinet card”57 and another taken when dressed in her Castles in 
the Air costume, were in circulation at the time.58★ Newsboy pub-
lished many cabinet cards during the Manola era. They were used 
as premiums and giveaways when other products, like cigarettes, 
were purchased. Manola surely agreed to have this picture, as well 
as the Castles in the Air pose, taken. And it is hard to believe that 
money was not exchanged. Modesty was not the problem.59 Con-
trol of the pose and compensation were. In short, it was what we 
now call a publicity rights case—one in which Manola claimed the 
right to decide how and when her image would be used for com-
mercial purposes. That notion is given additional credence by the 
sensationalized way the picture was taken from a box seat, the slow 
sale of tickets for Castles in the Air, and the reputation of Manola as 
a temperamental personage.60 Those running the production 
needed a publicity boost and found a way to get it. They eventually 
agreed not to use the picture. 
                                                                                                                            
56 Photographed in Tights, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1890, at 2 (cited in Warren & Brandeis, 
supra note 19, at 195 n.7). 
57 For a brief history of the “cabinet card,” see Cabinet Card, CITY GALLERY, 
http://www.city-gallery.com/learning/types/cabinet_card/index.php [http://perma.cc/
K6UX-HGUM] (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). The Manola cabinet card is available in the 
Ohio State University graphics collection at Marion Manola, OHIO ST. U., 
http://hdl.handle.net/1811/47628 [http://perma.cc/6ARF-L5GC] (last visited Sept. 28, 
2015). 
58★ To view the Castles in the Air image, see Glancy, supra note 22, at 403, and Richard 
H. Chused, Manola Castles in the Air Costume, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.
rhchused.com/Moments08.html [http://perma.cc/VA3L-5L5U] (last visited June 8, 
2015). 
59 Glancy suggests that a particular modesty issue was part of the story. Manola had a 
young daughter, Adelaide, in Catholic school. Protecting her from negative portrayals of 
her mother, Glancy argues, was an issue. If that is right, it could only have been because 
of the way in which a particular scene in a picture taken by surprise appeared to a viewer. 
That probably would not be an issue of modesty, however, so much as a manifestation of a 
desire to control both visual perspective and business dealings. See Glancy, supra note 22, 
at 414–15. 
60 See id. at 407–11. 
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But when Warren and Brandeis described the Brooklyn society 
lady and Manola disputes, they left a somewhat different impres-
sion about the nature of the issues at stake. They didn’t discuss 
issues of theft, conversion, appropriation, commercial exploitation, 
or publicity rights. As noted above, they opined that the two cases 
“directly involved the consideration of the right of circulating por-
traits; and the question whether our law will recognize and protect 
the right to privacy in this and in other respects must soon come 
before our courts for consideration.”61 For them the issue was not 
about commercial exploitation, but the ways in which the distribu-
tion of pictures and gossip interfered with the ability of citizens to 
construct a commodious existence on their own terms. In short, 
the actual disputes in the cases they referred to simply didn’t sup-
port the gossip theory they wrote about. 
The other three sources used by Warren and Brandeis did not 
involve litigation—threatened or otherwise. Two had virtually 
nothing to do with their notions of privacy.62 They, like the use of 
the Brooklyn society pictures and the Manola dispute, are not help-
ful in defining the nature of the privacy interests Warren and Bran-
deis wished to protect. Rather, the references simply confirm the 
lack of serious legal precedent supporting the claims they made. 
Only one—the essay by E.L. Godkin63—deserves any extended 
attention. In some ways, it is the most interesting and least persua-
sive of the lot.64★ As James Barron convincingly noted almost four 
                                                                                                                            
61 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 195–96. 
62 Jameson, supra note 37; Williams, supra note 37. 
The American Law Register item is an essay almost entirely about the evolution of 
evidence rules for the use of photographic images. Only on the last page is there a very 
brief foray into clandestinely taken pictures that are either defamatory or used for 
commercial purposes. Jameson, supra note 37, at 8. Jameson was an important lawyer and 
judge in Chicago. He died the year Warren and Brandeis published their article. E.O. 
JAMESON, THE JAMESONS IN AMERICA: 1647–1900 373–75 (1901). 
The Solicitors’ Journal item is from a British publication. It is a short snippet about 
the impact of introducing copyright protection into English law beginning in 1862. See 
Williams, supra note 37. The issue was ownership of the negative and the photograph 
given the presence of legal rules about both intellectual property and tangible property. It 
has very little, if anything, to do with the claims made by Warren and Brandeis. 
63 See Godkin, supra note 37, at 58. 
64★ An image of Godkin is available at Richard H. Chused, E.L. Godkin, APPROPRIATE(D) 
MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments09.html [http://perma.cc/Z9LA-WVEK] 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
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decades ago, much of the Warren-Brandeis article was anticipated 
in Godkin’s essay, The Rights of the Citizen: To His Own Reputation, 
published in Scribner’s Magazine the same year.65 Godkin linked 
the idea of privacy to the growth of civilization. “Privacy,” he 
wrote, “is a distinctly modern product, . . . unknown in primitive 
or barbarous societies.”66 In prose reeking with class elitism, God-
kin claimed, “To have a house of one’s own is the ambition of 
nearly all civilized men and women, and the reason which most 
makes them enjoy it is the opportunity it affords of deciding for 
themselves how much or how little publicity should surround their 
daily lives.”67 He concluded this segment of the essay with atti-
tudes sure to draw disdain from many in contemporary western 
society. 
Of course, the importance attached to this privacy 
varies in individuals. Intrusion on it afflicts or an-
noys different persons in different degrees. It an-
noys women more than men, and some men very 
much more than others. To some persons it causes 
exquisite pain to have their private life laid bare to 
the world, others rather like it; but it may be laid 
down as a general rule that the former are the ele-
ment in society which most contributes to its moral 
and intellectual growth, and that which the state is 
most interested in cherishing and protecting.68 
Needless to say, gossipy media was the enemy of privacy to 
Godkin. Those who craved attention and sought out press coverage 
were “depraved!”69 Nonetheless, he did not conclude that the law 
could provide a remedy for the problem. Short of defamation, it 
was difficult to legislate a solution. The only remedy, he claimed, 
was “to be found in attaching social discredit to invasions of it [pri-
vacy] on the part of the conductors of the press.”70 Here, of 
course, is the point where Warren and Brandeis “improved” upon 
                                                                                                                            
65 Barron, supra note 22, at 886–88. 
66 Godkin, supra note 37, at 65. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 66–67. 
70 Id. at 67. 
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Godkin’s theory by seeking creation of a tort remedy where none 
existed. But, they did so in ways that closely tracked Godkin’s 
ideas—not only in the way they described the issues, but also in 
defining the scope of the rule they wished to establish. Publication 
of material “of public or general interest” was not barred,71 and 
oral gossip, where injury ordinarily was deemed “trifling,” was ex-
cluded from coverage altogether in the absence of some form of 
special damage.72 The focus clearly was on personal gossip dis-
played in the press. 
Like Godkin, Warren and Brandeis associated with the Mug-
wumps—often described as members of the upper class led by fear 
of “social and economic displacement” to support “independent 
politics and conservative reforms.”73 According to Barron, the 
Warren and Brandeis article therefore can be read as a Mugwum-
pian effort to protect society from the “debilitating effects of gos-
sip” by defending a “traditional, ‘patrician’ perception of what 
was ‘news,’ what was of public interest and therefore publisha-
ble.”74 To the extent this is an accurate portrayal of the motiva-
tions of Warren and Brandeis, it simply reaffirms the notion that 
the core of their article has little to say about either publicity rights 
or present-day privacy debates. Its continuing popularity, there-
fore, may have much more to do with their magical incantation of 
the word “privacy” than with any important substantive claim. 
Single lines in the piece, abstracted from the norm they wished to 
create, took on a life of their own. And so “the right to be let 
alone”75 has become a talisman—one that resonated for the Fos-
                                                                                                                            
71 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 214. 
72 Id. at 217 (citing Godkin, supra note 37, at 66). 
73 Barron, supra note 22, at 915. 
74 Id. at 916. It might be worth speculating that this notion of a distinction between 
what was private and what was worthy of public discourse mirrored the similar late 
nineteenth-century efforts to distinguish between private and public in an array of other 
arenas. The former, such as economic preferences and contractual terms, were none of 
the government’s business. Involvement of the public was only appropriate when 
regulation, or perhaps revelation of information, was designed to protect the general 
welfare. Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the 
regulation of hours of male bakers violated substantive due process), with Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding that the supposed need to protect women from the 
demands of market forces justified regulating the length of their work day). 
75 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 193. 
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ters even though its most famous theoretical roots may have little 
to do with their problem. 
B. Predictions of the Future 
Lawrence Friedman put a subtly different cultural gloss than 
Barron and Godkin on the mood of some parts of elite society in 
the late nineteenth-century.76 He suggested that the same notions 
that Warren and Brandeis used to urge controls over gossip arose 
from efforts to suppress distribution of unfavorable information, in 
part to provide room for those of the middle and upper classes to 
fail and later redeem themselves.77 Protection of reputation, rather 
than merely suppression of gossip, was viewed as a way to guard 
society from the unnecessary harm that might be caused to all by 
the “fall” of important, typically male, figures working generally 
for the betterment of society.78 As a result, Friedman concluded, 
[O]ne can detect two concerns in American law in 
the nineteenth century . . . . These concerns seem to 
contradict each other. The law expressed and en-
forced a strict code of traditional morality. Yet the 
law also protected the reputations of respectable 
people—even when they strayed somewhat from 
the straight and narrow path. . . . At many points the 
concept of privacy underlay the central argument—
the idea that certain things (notably, the sexual side 
of life) had to be kept secret, kept private. Protect-
ing reputation in an important sense meant protect-
ing privacy, protecting the sanctity of the private 
realm, warts and all, especially or primarily for elite 
                                                                                                                            
76 See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY AND PRIVACY 6–10 (2007). For a lengthy 
review of and commentary on Friedman’s work, see Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian 
Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1407 (2009). 
77 FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 6–10. 
78 Id. at 6–7. Efforts to protect the elite from controversy, of course, were not always 
successful. Perhaps the best known is the Beecher-Tilton Controversy and subsequent 
trials over allegations that the famous pastor Henry Ward Beecher had an affair with 
Theodore Tilton’s wife, Elizabeth. The story behind the scandal that first erupted into 
public view in 1872 is beautifully told in BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS: THE AGE 
OF SUFFRAGE, SPIRITUALISM, AND THE SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL (1998). 
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and respectable people. The actual law of “priva-
cy,” explicitly using the word, is largely a creation 
of the twentieth century.79 
It is not surprising, therefore, that a notion of the “private 
realm” blossomed in the late nineteenth century—not as protec-
tion from unreasonable intrusions, but as a system to protect the 
burgeoning middle class from threats to reputation. As the middle 
and upper classes grew, travel became easier, and the press prolife-
rated, Warren, Brandeis, and their peers claimed an entitlement to 
control how the public learned about reputation. The shift did not 
represent a change in the underlying and long-standing sense 
among many of the elite that their lives should be largely inaccessi-
ble by others, but in the felt need to warn an increasingly intrusive 
world of the need to observe traditional boundaries. The rapid in-
crease in the number, circulation, and competitive instincts of the 
press in the late nineteenth century surely added to the concerns 
among the upper crust.80 That, perhaps, is why extrapolation of the 
concerns of Warren and Brandeis into contemporary life is war-
ranted. Though Warren and Brandeis bemoaned the deleterious 
effects of published—often trivial—gossip, some of the examples 
they cited involved the taking and distribution of pictures, and their 
text enunciated great concern about the spread and use of the then 
modern contraptions like concealed cameras.81 Publication of im-
ages of Brooklyn socialites and a comic opera singer in tights, 
though having little if anything to do with gossip, became symbols 
to the authors, and later, readers, of the overreaching, intrusive 
characteristics of the media that might cause permanent harm. So 
did the use of cameras. 
                                                                                                                            
79 FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 213. 
80 See, e.g., GERALD J. BALDASTY, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 113–46 (1992). The number of daily newspapers in the United 
States peaked in the very early 1900s. Circulation reached its first peak around 1920 
before leveling off in the 1930s and rising to its all time peak during World War II. See 
Matthew Gentzkow, Edward L. Glaeser, & Claudia Goldin, The Rise of the Fourth Estate: 
How Newspapers Became Informative and Why It Mattered, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: 
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 187, 191–92, 196 (Edward L. Glaeser & 
Claudia Goldin, eds., 2006). 
81 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 211. 
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As noted above, Warren and Brandeis bemoaned the arrival of 
“instantaneous photographs” that have “invaded the sacred pre-
cincts of private and domestic life.”82 Even here the focus is on 
private and domestic life—gossip about luncheon dates, weddings, 
and funerals. What was important to Warren and Brandeis may be 
mundane to us, but that surely does not negate the possibility that 
use of modern tools to appropriate intimate moments and distri-
bute them widely raises a host of boundary issues for citizens of 
today’s world that are related to but quite different from the lines 
drawn by Warren and Brandeis. Clearly, there are many contempo-
rary instances of malicious, digital, online discussions of peoples’ 
lives, and extremely harmful, viral displays of personal images faci-
litated by ubiquitous cell phone single-shot and video cameras.83 
There were at least three characteristics of late nineteenth-
century newspaper gossip that upset Warren and Brandeis and 
their elite colleagues—the authoring of stories about middle and 
upper class citizens without review by the subjects and the publica-
tion of information without consent; the personal, domestic and 
family nature of the published information; and the difficulty in 
questioning or second-guessing the content of the information re-
vealed. The invention of photography, increasingly smaller cam-
eras, rapid methods of communication such as the telegraph, and 
speedy printing techniques made the media seem threatening to 
them. What previously was kept within the boundaries of class 
based oral discourse became fodder for public display in the pub-
lished media. What previously was kept fenced in by the desire of 
middle and upper class men to protect themselves and their peers 
became subject to comment and criticism among the broader and 
supposedly less well-mannered body politic. The analogous con-
                                                                                                                            
82 Id. at 195; see supra discussion Part I.A. 
83 See, e.g., Marcy Peek, The Observer and the Observed: Re-imagining Privacy 
Dichotomies in Information Privacy Law, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51 (2009); 
DANIELLE CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE 
OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007). This 
observation is not intended to refer only or even to defamation. Online statements or 
images of people can have deleterious consequences when not harmful in ways cognizable 
in now traditional privacy litigation settings. The recent “reemergence” of Monica 
Lewinsky as a spokesperson for the sort of online shaming that can easily spread online is 
only one of many examples. Jessica Bennett, In Her Own Voice: Monica Lewinsky Is Back, 
but This Time It’s on Her Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2015, at ST1. 
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cerns felt by the Fosters were the surreptitious nature of Svenson’s 
picture-taking, the ubiquity of tiny cameras and other devices ca-
pable of quickly catching intimate moments, the use of images of 
people without their consent, the domestic, home-bound nature of 
the places depicted in the pictures, the display of the pictures in a 
public gallery space, and the distribution of images online.84 The 
Fosters did not complain about gossip. But they did want to reduce 
the impact modern technology has on the ability of unsuspecting 
citizens to control the way they were depicted to others.85 That, in 
modern terms, is at least partly analogous to what drove Warren 
and Brandeis to protest in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. 
II. THIS HISTORICAL JOURNEY: PHOTOGRAPHY, ART, AND 
CULTURE 
The camera is the common theme. It has been a revelatory tool 
for almost two centuries—glancing into and preserving fleeting 
moments of our deeply flawed memories or aiding the construction 
of deceptively lifelike portrayals in paintings and drawings. Photo-
graphy, once the domain of specialists and artists, is now a routine 
and often spontaneous or happenstance event.86 In the last century 
photographs have morphed from a symbol of public gossip disturb-
ing to the elite into a ubiquitous witness and intruder in the daily 
lives of the masses. But as change occurred in the technology, use, 
and distribution of photographs over the century and a half after 
the invention of compact cameras, several things remained con-
stant—the potential for taking pictures without the knowledge of 
the human subject, the ability to preserve pictures for significant 
periods of time, and the capacity to display images to many people. 
The historical developments in these arenas are the next stops in 
working through the issues in the Foster/Svenson dispute. What has 
been the history of surreptitious photography, art, and the “right to 
                                                                                                                            
84 See supra text and sources accompanying notes 6–8. 
85 See supra text and sources accompanying notes 6–8. 
86 I can’t help but recall the “Zapruder film.” While innocently capturing President 
Kennedy’s motorcade as it passed through Dallas, Abraham Zapruder ended up with 
images of the assassination. If you are desperate to watch it, see Zapruder Film Slow 
Motion (HIGH QUALITY), YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=iU83R7rpXQY [http://perma.cc/UA5U-8WE3], for a sequence of the film. 
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be let alone?” What sorts of controversies, debates, or disputes, if 
any, arose about use of cameras and photography? 
A. The Camera 
It is generally agreed that what we now call the camera first ap-
peared in the 1820s. The “camera obscura”87 was known for cen-
turies before the first true cameras materialized. Light passing 
through a small aperture into a darkened space would exit the other 
end and produce an inverted image on a surface or wall.88 Artists 
used the phenomenon, along with mirrors to right the appearance, 
to produce pictures and develop understanding of perspective.89 It 
also was known for centuries that certain silver salts darkened 
when exposed to light. It was not until the Frenchman Joseph 
Nicéphore Niépce, after years of experimentation, put the imaging 
and chemical processes together to produce the first photographs. 
A few years after his successful experiments, Niépce teamed up 
with another Frenchman studying photography—Louise Jacques 
Mande Daguerré—in efforts to improve the process. After Niépce 
died in 1833, Daguerré perfected what came to be called “daguer-
reotypes”—exposures on metal plates covered with silver iodide 
and bathed in mercury vapor after exposure to light that produced 
highly detailed images.90 The process, announced in 1839, was 
used to produce many pictures that retain their fine appearance 
today.91 Once the process became public, improvements rapidly 
                                                                                                                            
87 This is a Latin phrase literally meaning “dark chamber.” Camera Obscura, OXFORD 
UNIV. PRESS, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/cam
era-obscura [http://perma.cc/P56B-YBKJ] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
88 TODD GUSTAVSON, CAMERA: A HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY FROM DAGUERREOTYPE 
TO DIGITAL 2–4 (2009). 
89 Indeed, Tim Jeminson claimed in the 2013 documentary film Tim’s Vermeer that 
Johannes Vermeer used a camera obscura to make his famous seventeenth-century 
paintings. For a review of the film, see David Itzkoff, Tim Jenison, an Inventor, Paints 
“The Music Lesson,” N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, at AR21. 
90  GUSTAVSON, supra note 88, at 6. 
91
  Id. at 46; see also BEAUMONT NEWHALL, THE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY: FROM 1839 
TO THE PRESENT 18–19 (1982). Others had previously managed to produce images in the 
dark that deteriorated when exposed to light. Preserving them was the true dividing line 
between image creation and what we now know of as photography. It also appears that an 
Englishman, William Henry Fox Talbot, invented a quite similar process to 
daguerreotypes at about the same time. See NEWHALL, supra, at 19–21. 
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accumulated.92 Commercial studios opened to take pictures and 
sell portraits, and camera enhancements emerged.93 Having da-
guerreotypes made became a fad, especially in France, England, 
and the United States; millions of individual and family portraits 
were created.94 Dozens of studios opened in major cities. But it was 
a time consuming and somewhat laborious process to get a high 
quality daguerreotype. Those wanting a picture had to sit perfectly 
still for over thirty seconds.95 While mass production, assembly line 
type businesses produced images in less than half an hour, the finer 
studios took significantly more time. Daguerreotypes also were fra-
gile and required encasement behind glass. In addition, the lack of 
easily portable cameras and equipment to produce the final images 
left picture taking largely in the hands of commercial establish-
ments.96 
A number of changes had to occur before photography could 
move out of the studio and into the hands of the general, middle 
class citizenry. First, a way had to be found to avoid the need to 
produce an image directly from exposure to light. If the picture sur-
face or plate could be held aside and developed later, the camera 
and its related paraphernalia could more easily be moved from 
place to place. Decisions about which of multiple exposures should 
be preserved could be delayed. Second, the exposure time required 
to make an image had to be reduced—not simply to ease the labor 
of posing but also to make outdoor photography of changing sce-
nery, unstable objects, or moving figures possible. Both of these 
improvements emerged during the early 1840s with the “calo-
type.” It was perfected by William Talbot, one of the original de-
velopers of photography, in the 1830s.97 
                                                                                                                            
92  See GUSTAVSON, supra note 88, at 8–16 (explaining briefly twelve daguerreotype 
cameras, produced by camera makers in France and the United States from 1839 to 1851, 
that improved upon, or altered, the original design).  
93  Id. at 11. 
94 Id. at 11, 17; see also NEWHALL, supra note 91, at 32. 
95  See NEWHALL, supra note 91, at 32 (“It was hard work to be daguerreotyped; you had 
to cooperate with the operator, forcing yourself not only to sit still for about half a minute, 
but also to assume a normal expression.”). 
96  See id. at 30. 
97 Id. at 43–46; see also GUSTAVSON, supra note 88, at 21. The word “calotype” derives 
from a Greek word meaning “beautiful picture.” Talbot perfected the use of paper 
covered in silver iodide to make images, a significant advance over metal daguerreotypes. 
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But the invention of the calotype and similar processes was not 
enough to easily move photography out of the studio and onto the 
street. Taking pictures still required the use of bulky equipment 
and complicated development techniques. While expeditions carry-
ing equipment around the globe on ships and beasts of burden oc-
curred, they were neither easy nor cheap to mount. Shots of out-
door scenes began to appear early in the history of photography but 
it was not until after the middle of the nineteenth century that pho-
tography fully blossomed.98 The final steps in making photography 
a creature of the masses required that picture taking be simple, that 
preservation of multiple shots for long periods of times prior to de-
velopment be easy, and that carrying a camera virtually anywhere 
be a breeze. When small, easily portable cameras emerged after the 
Civil War—first in England and then in the United States—the 
stage was set for surreptitious picture taking.99 And the subversive 
possibilities became quite obvious as cameras placed inside pistols, 
book covers, cravats, binocular cases, purses, watches and briefcas-
es became available.100 Kodak, founded in 1888, took full advantage 
of the trend by heavily marketing its pocket cameras, perfecting 
fairly cheap and easy to use film rolls, and creating a widely availa-
ble system for developing pictures.101★ The stage—both personal 
and artistic—was set. 
B. Early Surveillance Photography 
This is not the place to attempt a comprehensive survey of sur-
veillance photography over the last century. Much has been written 
and the field is quite large. One recent museum project, however, 
serves well as an entrée into the field. In 2010 and 2011 the San 
Francisco Museum of Modern Art and the Tate Modern in Lon-
                                                                                                                            
98  See GUSTAVSON, supra note 88, at 38, 44.  
99 Id. at 100–13. 
100 Id. at 99–113. The pictures of such cameras in Gustavson’s book are quite 
remarkable. 
101★ See Richard H. Chused, Early Kodak Camera Advertisement, APPROPRIATE(D) 
MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments10.html [http://perma.cc/D2KC-
MDZT] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015), for an image of an early Kodak ad. I have also posted 
pictures of early Kodak cameras on my website. See Richard H. Chused, Early Kodak 
Cameras, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments11.html 
[http://perma.cc/338T-QB9T] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
2015] APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS 131 
 
don jointly mounted an exhibition called Exposed.102 It was an ex-
ploration of the ways in which photography and voyeurism are re-
lated. The show, displayed for a time at each museum, was divided 
into five segments—The Unseen Photographer, Voyeurism and De-
sire, Celebrity and the Public Gaze, Witnessing Violence, and Surveil-
lance.103 The wide-ranging show confirmed that once the camera 
became easily available for use in a broad cross section of human 
activities, pictures capturing private moments, artistic composi-
tions, politically charged environments, violence, war, scandal, and 
disfavored activities proliferated. Some of the most famous photo-
graphs in American history were on display at the museums. Well-
known images taken by Jacob Riis and published in 1890 in his clas-
sic muckraking book How the Other Half Lives were among the ear-
liest surreptitiously-taken photographs.104 Some of the pictures by 
Walker Evans displayed in Let Us Now Praise Famous Men—an 
equally famous volume that came to personify the hardships of the 
Great Depression—also were taken secretly.105 Evans’ later book, 
Many Are Called, contained covertly-taken images of people on the 
New York City subway system during the 1930s and 1940s.106 In 
these and many other examples displayed in the Tate/San Francis-
                                                                                                                            
102 Exposed: Voyeurism, Surveillance and the Camera, Exhibition Guide, TATE, 
http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/exposed/exposed-voyeurism-
surveillance-and-camera-exhibition-guide [http://perma.cc/LEJ3-GPPF] (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2015). 
103 Id. A companion book to the exhibition was published. EXPOSED: VOYEURISM, 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE CAMERA SINCE 1870 (Sandra S. Phillips ed., 2010) [hereinafter 
EXPOSED: VOYEURISM]. Each museum has a page on their website devoted to the 
exhibition. See Exposed, TATE, www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/
exposed [http://perma.cc/M576-N4S4] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
104 JACOB RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES (1890). 
105 JAMES AGEE & WALKER EVANS, LET US NOW PRAISE FAMOUS MEN (Houghton 
Mifflin Co. ed. 1960) (1941). The book was also reissued in 2001 with enhanced versions 
of the photographs taken by Evans. 
106 WALKER EVANS, MANY ARE CALLED (First Metro. Museum of Art/Yale Univ. Press 
ed., 2004) (1966). The book was not published for many years after the pictures were 
taken. The subway project recently became a principle event in a well-received novel. See 
AMOR TOWLES, RULES OF CIVILITY (2011). Its connection to Evans is described in 
reviews. See, e.g., Liesl Shillinger, Romantic Mischief in 1930s Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2011, at BR20; Sarah Coleman, Rules of Civility and Subway Photos, LITERATE 
LENS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://theliteratelens.com/2012/01/12/rules-of-civility-and-sub
way-photos [http://perma.cc/S8R3-RV4A]. 
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co exhibition, the photographs now are highly valued artistic, polit-
ical, and cultural classics of America and other nations. 
From early on some photographers felt the tension between 
their artistic and political goals and the sensibilities of those either 
in the images or viewing the pictures. Jacob Riis, however, was not 
one of them. Many of the photographs in How the Other Half Lives 
were the product of invasive behavior.107 Carrying a newfangled 
flash camera, he ventured with colleagues into the tenement house 
districts of New York, often at night, taking pictures of people in a 
variety of settings. Sometimes he caught sleeping vagrants and 
children, both on the street and inside living quarters. Others cap-
tured people carousing in back alleys and hallways. Permission was 
not sought. Sandra Phillips, senior curator at the San Francisco 
Museum of Modern Art, explained Riis’s activities. 
Riis walked through the tough parts of lower 
Manhattan describing the deplorable conditions in 
which poor people lived. But what made his descrip-
tive prose even more powerful were the photo-
graphs that accompanied it, made possible by the 
recent discovery of the magnesium flare and the 
flash gun . . . . Riis and some friends, mainly ama-
teur photographers, went at night into the most des-
titute neighborhoods and photographed in dark al-
leys, small rooms, even basements, often while the 
subjects were sleeping. The press called these pho-
tographers “the intruders,” and Riis’s pictures 
seemed especially intrusive when they were seen, 
greatly enlarged, in his popular lantern slide shows, 
his principle means of showing them to the pub-
lic . . . . 
Although his intent was to promote an improved 
standard of living for the poor, protect society from 
endangerment, and preserve humane intimacy, 
many of Riis’s photographs are almost shockingly 
invasive, a sense reinforced by the brutal, assaultive 
flash, especially potent in photographs made in-
                                                                                                                            
107 See RIIS, supra note 104. 
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doors of the sleeping poor. Even when awake, these 
people were sometimes so dead tired, inebriated, or 
desperate they seemed not to care, or even by aware 
that the man in front of them, focusing his camera 
and igniting the flare.108 
Phillips, with her modern sensibilities about privacy in sleeping 
quarters, expressed shock at the intrusive nature of pictures such as 
the one I have posted online.109★ While her reaction is understand-
able in contemporary terms, the issues were not at all the same for 
Riis. He was much more interested in adventure, the “art” of pho-
tography, and charitable reforms than he was in the feelings of his 
pictorial subjects. It is quite likely that his perceptions were influ-
enced by sensibilities virtually opposite those of his contempora-
ries—Warren and Brandeis. Rather than wondering about protect-
ing the lives of the elite, he used pictures of impoverished people to 
encourage voluntary social reform and to aggrandize his own ca-
reer. Like some other Progressives around the turn of the twentieth 
century, he had little faith in government reform efforts, thought 
Christian charity more likely than public programs to solve prob-
lems, was more than willing to blame immigrants and the poor for 
their often dispiriting plight, and found much to admire in Spense-
rian notions of natural selection.110 His public lectures were widely 
attended and helped stimulate sales of How the Other Half Lives. 
The book was a major best seller.111 Privacy was hardly on his mind. 
He mentioned the idea only twice—once to observe how useless 
                                                                                                                            
108 Id. 
109★ The image, entitled “Lodgers in a Crowded Bayard Street Tenement,” taken by 
Jacob Riis, is available in RIIS, supra note 104, at 57, and EXPOSED: VOYEURISM, supra note 
103, at 30. It is also available online. See Jacob Riis: How the Other Half Lives, 
APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments12.html [http://perma.
cc/N3LQ-LWLV] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) 
110 See BONNIE YOCHELSON & DANIEL CZITROM, REDISCOVERING JACOB RIIS: EXPOSURE 
JOURNALISM AND PHOTOGRAPHY IN TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY NEW YORK 106–15 (2007). 
Though many Progressives were deeply interested in government reforms, there also was 
a deep stream of opposition to government intervention among those claiming an interest 
in the plight of the impoverished. I found the same train of thought when studying 
landlord-tenant reforms at the turn of the twentieth century. See Richard Chused, 
Impoverished Tenants in Twentieth Century America, in LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 257–76 (Susan Bright ed., 2006). 
111 YOCHELSON & CZITROM, supra note 110, at 160. 
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the concept was in overcrowded tenements and the other to note in 
a similar vein that having doors in living quarters might be helpful 
in securing privacy.112 Any notion that he inappropriately intruded 
into the lives of tenement dwellers was outside his frame of refer-
ence. He occupied a superior social place. 
Riis’s views were typical of many, though certainly not all, early 
twentieth-century Progressives. He described residents of Jewtown 
in prose laden with the old canard about nefarious moneymaking: 
[I]n presenting the home life of these people, I have 
been at some pains to avoid the extreme of priva-
tion, taking the cases just as they came to hand on 
the safer middle ground of average earnings. Yet 
even the direst apparent poverty in Jewtown, unless 
dependent on the absolute lack of work, would, 
were the truth known, in nine cases out of ten have a 
silver lining in the shape of margin in bank.113 
Similarly, with the black poor, Riis expressed marginal antipa-
thy for the most atrocious forms of oppression while leaving no 
doubt about his lowly opinion of the race: 
Natural selection will have more or less to do 
beyond a doubt in every age with dividing the races; 
only so, it may be, can they work out together their 
highest destiny. But with the despotism that delibe-
rately assigns to the defenseless Black the lowest 
level for the purpose of robbing him there that has 
nothing to do. Of such slavery, different only in de-
gree from the other kind that held him as chattel, to 
be sold or bartered at the will of his master, this cen-
tury, if signs fail not, will see the end in New 
York.114 
By the time James Agee and Walker Evans published the classic 
book Let Us Now Praise Famous Men half a century later, the au-
thors expressed, though did not act upon, quite different notions 
about the significance of private spaces and intimate photogra-
                                                                                                                            
112 RIIS, supra note 104, at 133, 159. 
113 Id. at 148–49. 
114 Id. at 133. 
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phy.115 In 1936, they agreed to do a project for Fortune Magazine on 
“cotton tenantry in the United States, in the form of a photograph-
ic and verbal record of the daily living and environment of an aver-
age white family of tenant farmers.”116 Though the magazine 
project never saw the light of day,117 it led to publication of the book 
five years later. The opening lines of the volume revealed a dis-
tinctly different mindset from that of Riis. Agee began his powerful 
exploration of impoverished farmers with an agonizing appraisal of 
his own role: 
It seems to me curious, not to say obscene and tho-
roughly terrifying, that it could occur to an associa-
tion of human beings drawn together through need 
and chance and for profit into a company, an organ 
of journalism, to pry intimately into the lives of an 
undefended and appallingly damaged group of hu-
man beings, an ignorant and helpless rural family, 
for the purpose of parading the nakedness, disad-
vantage and humiliation of these lives before anoth-
er group of human beings, in the name of science, of 
“honest journalism” (whatever that paradox may 
mean), of humanity, of social fearlessness, for mon-
ey, and for a reputation for crusading and for unbias, 
which, when skillfully enough qualified, is exchan-
geable at any bank for money (and in politics, for 
votes, job patronage, abelincolnism, etc.); and that 
these people could be capable of meditating this 
prospect without the slightest doubt of their qualifi-
cation to do an “honest” piece of work, and with a 
conscious better than clear, and in the virtual certi-
tude of almost unanimous public approval.118 
                                                                                                                            
115 See BELINDA RATHBONE, WALKER EVANS: A BIOGRAPHY 118–38 (1995) for a full 
telling of the development of the project. 
116 AGEE & EVANS, supra note 105, at ix. 
117 Copies of the original manuscript that was never published have now been found and 
published. Christine Haughney, A Paean to Forbearance (the Rough Draft), N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 2013, at C1. 
118 AGEE & EVANS, supra note 105, at 7. 
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The deep respect Agee and Evans felt for members of the three 
families they befriended in Alabama is starkly evident in the regal 
qualities of the faces Evans captured and the artful way he com-
posed shots of rooms and locations empty of people.119★ It also is 
palpable in the way Agee described their movements as Evans took 
pictures when the houses were empty: 
No one is at home, in all this house, in all this 
land. It is a long while before their return. I shall 
move as they would trust me not to, and as I could 
not, were they here. I shall touch nothing but as I 
would touch the most delicate wounds, the most 
dedicated objects. 
The silence of the brightness of this middle 
morning is increased upon me moment by moment 
and upon this house, and upon this house the whole 
of heaven is drawn into one lens; and this house it-
self, in each of its objects, it, too, is one lens. 
I am being made witness to matters no human 
being may see. 
There is a cold beating at my solar plexus. I 
move in exceeding slowness and silence that I shall 
not dishonor nor awaken this house: and in every in-
stant of silence, it becomes more entirely perfected 
upon itself under the sun.120 
The very artistry of Agee’s prose mirrors the deep tensions he 
and Evans felt as they completed their invasive project. Their con-
cerns and internal conflicts were motivated both by an understand-
                                                                                                                            
119★ Two examples are posted online at Richard H. Chused, Agee and Walker, 
APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments13.html [http://perma.cc/
XD6V-LJQT] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). Both were taken by Evans when he was under 
contract with the Farm Security Administration as part of a number of New Deal 
programs to support the arts and develop support for reform programs. The photos are 
government documents now in the collection of the Library of Congress. The picture of 
Allie Mae Burroughs is available online. See Allie Mae Burroughs, Wife of a Cotton 
Sharecropper. Hale County, Alabama, LIB. OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/
fsa1998020949/PP [http://perma.cc/5TS4-GV76] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); Corner of 
Kitchen in Floyd Burroughs’ Cabin. Hale County, Alabama, LIB. OF CONG., http://www.loc
.gov/pictures/item/fsa1998020949/PP [http://perma.cc/YXH7-VEZK] (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2015). 
120 AGEE & EVANS, supra note 105, at 135–36. 
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ing of the intrusive nature of their work and by deep respect for the 
strength of the poor families they befriended. But, of course, Evans 
went ahead and took the pictures. They also “explored bureau 
drawers, storage trunks, kitchen cupboards, and closets, making a 
thorough inventory of their contents.”121 Perhaps this was a con-
cession to the importance of the political contours of their work. Or 
maybe Evans and Agee felt free to go ahead because they obtained 
some level of consent from the families they imposed upon. They 
did, however, carry guilt with them as they left Alabama and head-
ed back to New York: 
When they finally made their departure . . . Agee 
and Evans felt as much guilt as they had setting out. 
But now their guilt was real rather than simply an-
ticipated. They knew that what they had done 
would not really change the families’ lives for the 
better, and they knew that the families were under 
the innocent impression that it would.122 
The notion that Agee and Evans could help the locals obtain 
government assistance was left intact, both while the project was 
documented and after it ended. In any case, the book received 
mixed reviews and did not sell well.123 But, when the volume was 
condemned in reviews, it was not Evans’ images that evoked dys-
pepsia; rather, it was Agee’s sometimes unfathomable prose that 
left critical readers at sea.124 
Not long after Evans took the photographs used in Let Us Now 
Praise Famous Men, he began another project taking pictures with a 
hidden camera of riders on the New York City subways. He was far 
                                                                                                                            
121 RATHBONE, supra note 115, at 129. 
122 Id. at 137. 
123 See Malcolm Jones, Revisiting James Agee: Discovering the Original “Let Us Now 
Praise Famous Men,” DAILY BEAST (June 7, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://www.thedaily
beast.com/articles/2013/06/07/revisiting-james-agee-discovering-the-original-let-us-
now-praise-famous-men.html [http://perma.cc/A6RC-WW7A]. 
124 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ESSAY 16–18 (Tracy Chevalier ed., 1977). For a conflicted 
review, see the 1941 essay of Whittaker Chambers, Books: Experiment in Communication, 
TIME (Oct. 13, 1941), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,766271,
00.html [http://perma.cc/HUD8-SSHD]. 
138 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:103 
 
from the only person doing it.125 Evans’ images, however, were not 
published until Many Are Called was released in 1966. Before the 
book appeared, Evans claimed that the twenty-five year interval 
between creating the images and their release was due to his con-
cern about reactions from those portrayed in the pictures. In Har-
per’s Bazaar, however, he admitted for the first time, 
[T]he portraits on these pages were caught by a hid-
den camera, in the hands of a penitent spy and apo-
logetic voyeur. But the rude and impudent invasion 
involved has been carefully softened and partially 
mitigated by a planned passage of time. These pic-
tures were made twenty years ago, and deliberately 
preserved from publication.126 
But, as Jeff Rosenheim was careful to note, the delay may have 
been due as much to Evans’ difficulty in finding a publisher, as it 
was to concern about the feelings of those pictured.127 Further-
more, eight of the pictures were published in 1956.128 Luc Sante, in 
his foreword to the 2004 edition of the book, doubted that the de-
lay was due to any fear of litigation.129 
Twenty-five years passed between the completion of this book 
and its original publication. Although folklore has it that Walker 
Evans feared lawsuits from his unwitting subjects, the times were 
nowhere near as litigious as ours. Furthermore, Evans had been 
photographing people on the street, many of them unaware, for 
well over a decade by then, and he also knew that photographers 
from Paul Strand to Helen Levitt, who often sat beside him on the 
subway as his assistant and decoy, had taken surreptitious street 
pictures with a periscopic lens, and nobody had ever gone after 
                                                                                                                            
125 See TRACY FITZPATRICK, ART AND THE SUBWAY: NEW YORK UNDERGROUND 117–31 
(2009). These surreptitiously-taken pictures can be usefully compared to the use of 
portraits taken with consent. See, e.g., Corey Kilgallon, The Faces on the Ferry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2015, at MB9. This is an article about pictures taken by Marcus Trappaud 
Bjorn, a Danish photographer, on the Staten Island Ferry. Bjorn’s images are quite good, 
though they lack the spontaneity, informality and compositional qualities of spur of the 
moment photography. 
126 Jeff L. Rosenheim, Afterword, in EVANS, supra note 106, at 203–04. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 202. 
129 Luc Sante, Foreward, in EVANS, supra note 106. 
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them when the results were exhibited or published. It is unlikely 
that Evans would have felt he needed to protect himself from poss-
ible retribution, but on the other hand he may well have been ap-
prehensive about how his subject might react emotionally.130 
And that’s the rub. Even if Evans empathized with the feelings 
of those whose pictures he secretly took, that did not translate into 
declining to snap the pictures or later publish them. Concern about 
privacy was “in the air” but not determinative of his or others’ ar-
tistic actions. 
While Riis, Agee, and Evans were among the most famous 
American surveillance photographers of the first half of the twen-
tieth century, they had many other well-known contemporary and 
successor colleagues. Lewis Hine took pictures of child laborers in 
mines without the knowledge of the mine owners; Paul Strand, Al-
fred Stieglitz, Ben Shahn, Helen Levitt, Henri Cartier-Bresson, 
Arthur Fellig, and Diane Arbus all took pictures without consent.131 
And, of course, there is the famous dispute over Frederick Wise-
man’s 1967 documentary film Titicut Follies—a devastating portrait 
of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater.132 
“Insane persons charged with crime and defective delinquents” 
were committed to the facility.133 Wiseman obtained oral permis-
sion from the state’s Commissioner of Correction and the Attorney 
General to film operations at the institution.134 The terms of the 
understanding became the subject of much disagreement after then 
Massachusetts Attorney General Elliot Richardson concluded that 
they had been violated and that the privacy rights of the institu-
tion’s inmates breached. Scenes in the film are quite stark and chal-
lenging to watch—preparation of a suicide victim’s body for burial, 
                                                                                                                            
130 Id. at 11. 
131 Their careers are briefly sketched in Sandra Phillips, The Unseen Photographer, in 
EXPOSED: VOYEURISM, supra note 103, at 20–23. 
132 FREDERICK WISEMAN, TITICUT FOLLIES (1967). Wiseman may be the most famous 
documentary filmmaker of twentieth-century America. He has made dozens of films. In 
each, he displays people moving, speaking and working in an institution or place, edits the 
film, and presents it without any narration. The subjects of each film he makes quite 
literally speak for themselves. Movies and videos were not part of the Tate/San Francisco 
Modern exhibition, but it would be a striking omission in an essay like this to ignore 
Wiseman’s activities. 
133 Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Mass. 1969). 
134 Id. at 612–13. 
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forced feedings, masturbation, nude inmates confined in their cells, 
and strip searches, among others. After a trial court enjoined all 
showings of the film, the Massachusetts Supreme Court modified 
the injunction to permit educational performances “to legislators, 
judges, lawyers, sociologists, social workers, doctors, psychiatrists, 
students in these or related fields, and organizations dealing with 
the social problems of custodial care and mental infirmity.”135 The 
court expressed deep concern about the vagueness of the permis-
sion granted to Wiseman, the inability of many inmates to agree to 
their filming, and the failure to obtain consent from many of those 
filmed.136 
Though Wiseman and others have claimed that the First 
Amendment prevents Massachusetts from limiting use of the film, 
it is easy to understand why its display was constrained. Despite 
the fact that it led to significant changes in the way we treat those 
confined because of mental limitations, the extent of its intrusion 
into the lives of the inmates was stunning. But for purposes of this 
Article, the most interesting happening is not the partial banning of 
the film in the late 1960s, but its release for general use in 1991. 
Though he previously viewed the film as an egregious intrusion 
into the lives of Bridgewater’s inmates and was responsible for is-
suing the initial injunction against its display, Judge Andrew Gill 
Meyer concluded that a “quarter century has passed since the film 
was made” and that “no evidence of harm to any individual” re-
sulted from its showings.137 This denouement echoes the belated 
publication of Walker Evans’ subway pictures—acceding to the 
realities of the passage of time. The fate of Wiseman’s film was a 
symbol not only of the somewhat heightened cultural awareness of 
privacy issues during the 1960s, but also the fading impact of intru-
sion as time passes. 
                                                                                                                            
135 Id. at 618. For a brief summary of the judicial history of the dispute, see Comment, 
The “Titicut Follies” Case: Limiting the Public Interest Privilege, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 359 
(1970). 
136 Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d at 616–17. 
137 Paul Langner, Last Curb on ‘Titicut Follies’ is Lifted, 24 Years After Ban, BOS. GLOBE, 
Aug. 2, 1991. The judge did, however, require that the names and addresses of people 
shown in the film remain confidential. Id. 
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In an affidavit accompanying his motion to dismiss the Fosters’ 
claims, Arne Svenson noted other more recent photographers have 
followed in the footsteps of Riis, Agee, and Evans.138 For purposes 
of this Article, the most pertinent artists he noted were Michael 
Wolf and Michelle Iverson.139 Wolf’s 2008 book, The Transparent 
City, commissioned by the Museum of Contemporary Photography 
in Chicago, contained an array of color pictures taken with a tele-
photo lens in Chicago.140 Wolf, whose work is in the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art among other important institutions,141 captured 
people at home and at work. He began by taking images of large 
buildings in downtown Chicago from high open-air vantage points. 
He then blew up pictures—sometimes hundreds of times—of en-
tire structures and discovered images not visible when he snapped 
the shots. Though they became pixelated, images of people in vari-
ous forms of apparent concern, distress, boredom, and partial nudi-
ty emerged. Examples, available on his website, include one of a 
man standing in his office and another of a pixelated woman’s face 
in apparent distress.142 Wolf’s pictures, like Svenson’s, generated 
some controversy,143 though no litigation was filed. 
                                                                                                                            
138 Supplemental Affidavit of Arne Svenson ¶¶ 6–10, Foster v. Svenson, No. 
651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2013). 
139 Svenson also referred to the work of Mitchell Epstein. See Supplemental Affidavit of 
Arne Svenson, supra note 138, ¶ 8 (referring to Epstein’s City series); see also The City, 
MITCHELL EPSTEIN, http://mitchepstein.net/work/city/index.html [http://perma.cc/
2B3K-CK64] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
140 MICHAEL WOLF, THE TRANSPARENT CITY (2008). 
141 One of his pieces is in the Metropolitan collection online. See The Online Collection, 
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-
collection-online/search/287975?rpp=30&pg=1&ft=michael+wolf&pos=1 [http://perma.
cc/PET8-ZWEZ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). For a list of other museum collections, see 
Biography, MICHAEL WOLF, http://photomichaelwolf.com/#biography [http://perma.cc/ 
9XDF-SFK6] (last visited Dec. 21, 2015). 
142 See Transparent City Detail #7, MICHAEL WOLF, http://photomichaelwolf.com/
#transparent-city-details/7 [http://perma.cc/49NN-GBW4] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015); 
Transparent City #32, MICHAEL WOLF, http://photomichaelwolf.com/#transparent-
city/10 [http://perma.cc/BQC9-HAY2] (last visited Dec. 21, 2015). I have elected not to 
show pictures by either Wolf or Iverson even though it really is not possible to sense the 
nature of their work without looking at the images. 
143 See, e.g., James Estrin, Showcase: Life Behind Glass, N.Y. TIMES: LENS (July 2, 2009), 
http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/showcase-14/ [http://perma.cc/9FKC-
DUR3]. 
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Many of the black and white pictures in Michele Iversen’s 
Night Surveillance Series display people’s faces and lives in much 
more revealing and perhaps disturbing ways than in Svenson’s.144 
She drove at night to various residential neighborhoods, parked in 
front of houses and waited with her camera for events to unfold. 
Her webpage has an artist’s statement that would clearly upset the 
Foster family. It reads: 
Night Surveillance Series 
As a photographer, I choose to reveal aspects of 
human nature that were previously hidden from 
view. These unknown images are constructed from 
real life. I use the camera as a tool to objectively 
document and create intimate discoveries through 
both systematic and chance shooting. 
In the Night Surveillance Series, I have cautiously 
and randomly photographed people inside of their 
homes through windows . . . witnessing curious be-
haviors. Surveillance is an important element for 
me. I fearfully wait for an image to record, and to 
steal the privacy of the subject separated only by a 
window of glass. These images are motivated by 
fear. I am afraid to be seen, afraid to watch at the 
very same moment I determine when to suspend a 
stranger’s privacy. I feel stimulation from the viola-
tion imposed upon the unknowingly compliant sub-
jects. An intense aesthetic/erotic friction occurs. 
                                                                                                                            
144 See Night Surveillance Series, MICHELE IVERSON, http://micheleiversen.com/ 
nsseries.html [http://perma.cc/8CCH-HK9H] (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). See, for 
example, a scene of three women talking in a kitchen—Untitled No. 31 (Pasadena, CA 
1995). According to Svenson’s affidavit, Iverson has been working on this series since 
1995. See Supplemental Affidavit of Arne Svenson, supra note 138, ¶ 9. She also has 
received a grant from the New York State Foundation for the Arts. An even more 
revealing mental image of Iverson is presented in a monologue she gave on a radio show. 
It is available on Studio 360 in a story created by Jonathan Mitchell that was originally 
aired on December 17, 2010. The excerpt with Iverson speaking is part of an hour-long 
program. See Jonathan Mitchell, She Sees Your Every Move, STUDIO 360 (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://www.studio360.org/story/162548-she-sees-your-every-move [http://perma.cc/6B 
BF-2UAG]; see also Kurt Anderson, Surveillance, STUDIO 360 (Dec. 17, 2010), 
http://www.studio360.org/story/108704-surveillance [http://perma.cc/NRZ2-639D] 
(containing the full program on surveillance technology). 
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However, I am compelled to make these images and 
to expose the voyeuristic tendencies inherent in 
human culture. 
The photographs measure 40” x 48”. They are 
intimate and anonymous, familiar and uncomforta-
ble, while at the same time the viewer is complicit 
with the voyeurism conveyed by each image.145 
There is therefore little doubt that Svenson’s work is part of a 
significant genre of highly regarded photography and filmmaking. 
Many major galleries and museums in addition to the Tate London 
and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art have devoted sig-
nificant space and resources for exhibitions of this kind of work. 
Barring the display of Svenson’s images risks delegitimizing an ar-
tistic movement of some importance. There is, therefore, a dramat-
ic tension between the artistic preferences of photographers like 
Wolf, Iverson, and Svenson and the privacy concerns of the Fos-
ters. 
III. THE LEGAL JOURNEY 
The Foster/Svenson case does not fit comfortably within the 
present structure of privacy law. Traditional rationales for creating 
privacy torts don’t accurately speak to the dispute. The tensions 
between the artistic and cultural intentions of photographers and 
the preferences of imaged subjects fall outside the ways we normal-
ly think about this legal arena. An additional layer of dissonance has 
arisen with the arrival in the last two decades of digital photogra-
phy, easy image manipulation, and vast online distribution systems. 
For this part of the inquiry, I first will investigate traditional priva-
cy tort norms to see why they do not provide an appropriate way to 
resolve the Foster dispute. Second, with the help of others who 
have written in the field, I’ll take a stab at constructing a new way 
of thinking about the case. 
                                                                                                                            
145 Night Surveillance Series, supra note 144. 
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A. Traditional Privacy Tort Law 
Commonly discussed rubrics for thinking about and describing 
privacy intrusions don’t work well in the dispute between the Fos-
ters and Svenson. They are either inapplicable to or unsuitable for 
use. Common law theories of privacy rights—largely derived from 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, written in 1977—are very diffi-
cult to apply in this circumstance. The rules about intrusive privacy 
violations require quite offensive behavior, particularly at the place 
or moment of the intrusion146—a major obstacle for the Fosters. 
Little attention is paid to the post-intrusion life of any images ob-
tained147—a crucial oversight in our digital world. Trespass, in the 
absence of a dramatic shift to a theory not based on physical incur-
sions, is simply inapplicable.148 The recent development of publici-
ty rights, often described as an aspect of privacy, is widespread. But 
the general rule barring nonconsensual use of a person’s name, 
likeness or voice for commercial purposes does not fit the Foster 
situation. The Restatement guidelines may provide protection 
against highly offensive physical or electronic intrusions, unreason-
able public disclosure of private information or intentional revela-
tion of facts placing a person in a false light, but they generally 
don’t cover a situation like the surreptitious taking of pictures 
through open windows.149 Privacy in the constitutional sense, and 
especially the now commonplace phrase “expectation of privacy,” 
is particularly difficult to fathom in settings where people are open-
ly visible to the world and the invading party is private rather than 
governmental. 
Traditional privacy tort law defines a narrow set of wrongs.150 
Since William Prosser penned his famous article, Privacy, in 
                                                                                                                            
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
147 Id. In the language of the rule, the tort arises from the “intrusion,” not the later 
consequences flowing from distribution of images. 
148 In the Foster case, there was no physical intrusion. Relief was possible only if the 
standard definition of “trespass” was expanded to include the use of cameras to obtain 
images of areas normally accessible only to someone present in the space. 
149 New York, where the Foster dispute arose, generally does not provide relief for any 
privacy violations that fall outside of the “right of publicity” rubric. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 
LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2014); see also discussion infra note 154. 
150 The literature is enormous. A good starting point for the uninitiated is Richards & 
Solove, supra note 22. A longer version of Solove’s ideas is available in SOLOVE, supra 
note 83. 
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1960,151 courts generally have given credence to the four categories 
of harms he described. 
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or 
 solitude, or into his private affairs. 
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private 
 facts about the plaintiff. 
(3)  Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false 
 light in the public eye. 
(4)  Appropriation, for the defendant’s 
 advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or 
 likeness.152 
This basic structure was copied by the authors of the Second 
Restatement.153 The Fosters are unlikely to gain much solace from 
                                                                                                                            
151 See Prosser, supra note 22, at 383. 
152 Id. at 389. Though intentional infliction of emotional distress often touches on 
privacy issues, it was never included in Prosser’s structure. See Richards & Solove, supra 
note 22, at 1907–09. 
153 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Prosser 
served as the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, so it is hardly surprising 
that his views of privacy resurfaced. Though he died in 1972 before the new version was 
published, it emerged virtually unchanged. The privacy provisions are as follows: 
652A. General Principle 
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to 
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by: 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as 
stated in 652B; or 
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated 
in 652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, 
as stated in 652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false 
light before the public, as stated in 652E. 
652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon 
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person. 
652C. Appropriation of Name or Likeness 
One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion 
of his privacy. 
652D. Publicity Given to Private Life 
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this taxonomy, not simply because New York is one of the states 
that does not recognize a common law privacy tort,154 but because 
                                                                                                                            
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of 
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that 
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. 
652E. Publicity Placing Person in False Light 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that 
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the 
false light in which the other would be placed. 
Id. §§ 652A–E. 
154 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2009). While there are statutory 
provisions that were adopted in 1903, they deal mostly with right of publicity claims. The 
pertinent text of these provisions follows: 
Section 50 – Right of privacy 
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, 
or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any 
living person without having first obtained the written consent of 
such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Section 51 – Action for injunction and for damages 
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within 
this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade 
without the written consent first obtained as above provided may 
maintain an equitable action in the supreme court of this state 
against the person, firm or corporation so using his name, 
portrait, picture or voice, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; 
and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained 
by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly 
used such person’s name, portrait, picture or voice in such 
manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section fifty 
of this article, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary 
damages. But nothing contained in this article shall be so 
construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation from 
selling or otherwise transferring any material containing such 
name, portrait, picture or voice in whatever medium to any user 
of such name, portrait, picture or voice, or to any third party for 
sale or transfer directly or indirectly to such a user, for use in a 
manner lawful under this article; nothing contained in this article 
shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or 
corporation, practicing the profession of photography, from 
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the standards themselves are likely to be unavailing.155 The Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts section 652B’s unlawful intrusion 
                                                                                                                            
exhibiting in or about his or its establishment specimens of the 
work of such establishment, unless the same is continued by 
such person, firm or corporation after written notice objecting 
thereto has been given by the person portrayed; and nothing 
contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any 
person, firm or corporation from using the name, portrait, 
picture or voice of any manufacturer or dealer in connection 
with the goods, wares and merchandise manufactured, produced 
or dealt in by him which he has sold or disposed of with such 
name, portrait, picture or voice used in connection therewith . . . 
.Nothing contained in the foregoing sentence shall be deemed to 
abrogate or otherwise limit any rights or remedies otherwise 
conferred by federal law or state law. 
Id. §§ 50-51 
 New York courts have consistently refused to allow expansion of these provisions to 
cover the taking and sale of pictures unattached to the marketing of a separate product. 
Plaintiffs must show that their picture was used for purposes of advertising or trade 
without consent. Under this standard, non-consensual use of an image to promote a 
product is one thing. Sale of the image itself is another. Therefore, a person whose name, 
address, date of birth, and social security number were published by a daily newspaper 
along with information concerning involvement in an illegal sports gambling operation, 
could not recover because the information was published by defendant in a newsworthy 
article and was not used for advertising or trade purposes. See, e.g., Valeriano v. Rome 
Sentinel Co., 43 A.D.3d 1357 (N.Y. 2007).  
 Similarly, an artist may make a work of art that includes a recognizable likeness of 
person without consent and sell copies without violating privacy statutes, see Simeonov v. 
Tiegs, 159 Misc.2d 54 (N.Y. 1993), use the identity of a person in a work of fiction, see 
Costanza v. Seinfeld, 279 A.D.2d 255 (N.Y. 2001), or use a photo in a book on nude 
beaches with the recognizable image of a person who was present at the time, see Creel v. 
Crown Publishing, Inc., 115 A.D.2d 414 (N.Y. 1985). These disputes should be contrasted 
with Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 379 (1984), where a surreptitiously taken 
picture of a mother and her child bathing nude in a stream was later used without 
permission in an ad for a product claiming to get rid of cellulite. The picture was from the 
side and did not show faces, but was remanded for trial on whether the plaintiffs were 
recognizable. Putting aside the privacy intrusion issues at stake in this Article, the 
limitation on publicity right claims makes some sense. Many photographs of people are 
taken both without consent and without serious concerns about privacy. The sales of such 
images should not raise publicity rights problems. 
155 A fairly recent, tragic case is a perfect example of both the unwillingness of the New 
York courts to allow common law privacy claims and the difficulties of meeting the 
traditionally defined privacy intrusion standard about to be described in the text. N.Y. 
Med, an ABC-TV series, broadcast a recording made in the New York-Presbyterian 
Hospital emergency room of the futile efforts to save the life of a man hit by a garbage 
truck. For more details, see Charles Ornstein, Dying in the E. R., and on TV, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2014, at MB1. Neither the dying man, Mark Chanko, nor any member of his family 
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standard—the most relevant to the Fosters—provides, “One who 
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”156 The commen-
tary indicates clearly that the interest protected is “solitude or sec-
lusion,” that publicizing the results of the intrusion is not a prere-
quisite to suit,157 and that the intrusion need not be physical.158 
While the standard seems applicable, the requirement that the in-
trusion be highly offensive to a reasonable person is a major stum-
bling block. The cases providing some form of relief typically in-
volve obvious intrusions, such as divorce disputes where one soon-
to-be ex-partner plants listening or video devices in the home of the 
other or disputes between neighbors involving long-term surveil-
lance.159 The examples in the Restatement commentary typically 
have either a dramatic quality about them—a hospital picture taken 
                                                                                                                            
consented to the recording of the hospital scenes or their later broadcast. No identifying 
information about the patient was revealed though he was visible with a pixelated face 
during the broadcast. The family sued the hospital, doctor, and TV network. Their 
privacy intrusion claims were dismissed. The trial court allowed an intentional infliction 
of emotional distress cause of action to go forward against the network, but that was 
reversed on appeal. The Appellate Division concluded that the imposition upon Mark 
Chanko’s family when they saw the episode without any knowledge of its impending 
broadcast “was not so extreme and outrageous as to support a claim” for emotional 
distress. Chanko v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 122 A.D.3d 487 (N.Y. 2014). That 
limitation on emotional distress claims is quite similar to the traditional privacy intrusion 
rule requiring that the invasion must be highly objectionable to a reasonable person. It is 
very difficult to justify the Chanko result. 
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B. 
157 Id. § 652B cmt. a: 
The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not 
depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is 
invaded or to his affairs. It consists solely of an intentional 
interference with his interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his 
person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable man. 
158 Id. § 652B cmt. b: 
The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the 
defendant has secluded himself . . . . It may also be by the use of the 
defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or 
overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs . . . . It may be by some other 
form of investigation or examination into his private concerns . . . . 
159 See, e.g., Polay v. McMahon, 10 N.E.2d 1122 (Mass. 2014); In re Marriage of Tigges, 
758 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 2008). 
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after being told to leave160—or a quality of persistence and stub-
bornness by the intruder—intimate picturetaking over a period of 
time.161 In addition, public spaces, or perhaps spaces left visible to 
those in other places, are not environments conducive to privacy 
lawsuits.162 
While it is possible that these norms might be met in the Foster 
setting, it is a very steep hill to climb. There are a series of signifi-
cant problems and potentially illogical limitations on the claim. 
First, there is no evidence that Svenson took pictures over a long 
period of time. Second, Svenson took pictures of a variety of 
apartments in addition to that of the Fosters. Only two of the im-
ages in The Neighbors exhibition involved their abode.163 He was not 
particularly obsessed with them. Third, all the pictures in the exhi-
bition involved views through windows totally or significantly un-
                                                                                                                            
160 One example reads, 
A, a woman, is sick in a hospital with a rare disease that arouses 
public curiosity. B, a newspaper reporter, calls her on the telephone 
and asks for an interview, but she refuses to see him. B then goes to 
the hospital, enters A’s room and over her objection takes her 
photograph. B has invaded A’s privacy. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 1. 
161 Another example tells this little story: “A, a private detective seeking evidence for 
use in a lawsuit, rents a room in a house adjoining B’s residence, and for two weeks looks 
into the windows of B’s upstairs bedroom through a telescope taking intimate pictures 
with a telescopic lens. A has invaded B’s privacy.” Id. § 652 cmt. b, illus. 2.  
 Life imitates Restatement examples. See Terrence McCoy, Penn State Frat Boys Sure 
Enjoyed Posting Facebook Pics of Passed Out, Nude Women, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/03/18/what-penn-state-
frat-brothers-said-while-posting-pics-of-passed-out-nude-women [http://perma.cc/GZS3-
HJEM]. This article describes one of a spate of recent fraternity scandals. Or recall the 
incredible incident of a Modern Orthodox rabbi hiding a video device in a mikva (ritual 
purification bath) in a synagogue. See Michael Paulson, Prominent Rabbi Arrested on a 
Charge of Voyeurism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2014, at A26. 
162 That doesn’t mean controversy is lacking. Street photography, now a common 
artistic endeavor, does not pass unnoticed. Bruce Gilden is certainly one of the most 
talked about and sometimes disliked practitioners of the genre. For commentary on his 
work from a fellow traveler and blogger, see Erik Kim, Bruce Gilden: Asshole or Genius, 
ERIC KIM PHOTOGRAPHY BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://erickimphotography.com/blog/
2011/06/24/bruce-gilden-asshole-or-genius [http://perma.cc/9VXT-ZUBT]. Or you can 
visit Gilden’s website and make up your own mind. BRUCE GILDEN, http://www.
brucegilden.com [http://perma.cc/5UUF-UDDU] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
163 It is possible he has more pictures that have not been publicly displayed, but I have 
no way of obtaining information about that at the moment. 
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obstructed by curtains or blinds. The occupants, in a sense, allowed 
others to view them and perhaps therefore waived any intrusion 
claims. Fourth, as far as I can tell, all but one of the images in the 
exhibition was of living spaces, not bedrooms. These were not 
places where Svenson would have expected people to disrobe while 
leaving their shades up. And finally, Svenson’s intention was not 
malicious, unkind, or prurient. His goals were artistic. In short, 
there is a strong basis for concluding that the traditional privacy 
intrusion rules do not cover this case—that they would not be 
deemed “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”164 When 
merged with the focus on the moment of intrusion rather than the 
range of impacts—before, during and after the intrusion—the doc-
trine artificially limits the factors that may be taken into account. 
For quite similar reasons, traditional ideas about physical intru-
sions into property aren’t helpful. It is obvious that prying human 
eyes, whether looking through a camera lens or not, do not trespass 
on the place being viewed. And, of course, eyes and the cameras in 
front of them are now the least of our problems. Technology has 
made it possible to discern much about what goes on inside build-
ings without either physically entering them or using our eyes to 
discern activity. Heat detectors can peer through walls and sound 
receivers can amplify faint noises emanating from many types of 
places.165 Roving cameras in cars, robots, drones, and satellites turn 
Google Maps and other systems into unreal ways of viewing the 
world’s features—large and small alike. Indeed, the happenstance 
ways people and homes are imaged as Google’s cameras scour the 
world raises issues related to those under discussion here.166 
But even if you wished to dramatically reconstruct the idea of 
trespass to include sensory intrusions into homes by the use of 
cameras, listening devices, heat detectors or other (perhaps not yet 
invented) contraptions, there is no obvious way to categorize which 
                                                                                                                            
164 This is the standard norm found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 652B. 
165 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (involving the use of detection 
devices without a warrant, the Supreme Court disallowed use of the evidence obtained 
without a warrant); Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014) (barring the routine search 
of cell phone contents after a stop or an arrest without a warrant). 
166 For a review of some of the issues, see Roger C. Geissler, Private Eyes Watching You: 
Google Street View and the Right to an Inviolate Personality, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 897 (2012). 
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sensory intrusions should be deemed unlawful. Attempting to do so 
only recreates the dilemmas presented by the dispute between the 
Fosters and Svenson. Some intrusions may be perfectly acceptable; 
others may not. The presence or non-presence of a particular in-
trusive device does not resolve the problem. In addition, the re-
quirement that the invasion be highly offensive is a significant and 
perhaps irrational standard in a world filled with barely obvious or 
subtle ways of gaining access to the intimate lives of others. 
Nor do standard notions of commercial exploitation embedded 
in doctrines like publicity rights resolve the problems. The core of 
publicity rights attacks the use of a well-known person’s name or 
likeness to endorse or sell a product—using a famous name as a 
product moniker or a well-known person’s likeness in an adver-
tisement without obtaining consent. So courts have barred Chris-
tian Dior from using Barbara Reynolds—a Jackie Onassis look-
alike—in advertisements167★ and Ford Motor Company from hiring 
Ula Hedwig—a one-time backup singer for Bette Midler—to 
record a Midler staple with an amazingly good imitation of Mid-
ler’s voice in a TV spot for Mercury Sable automobiles.168 Though 
the baseline rule makes sense as a way of deterring those who at-
tempt to reap where they have not sown, it has too often been used 
                                                                                                                            
167★ Philip Shenon, Court Supports Mrs. Onassis on Ad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 1984), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/13/nyregion/court-supports-mrs-onassis-on-ad.html 
[http://perma.cc/2ABX-NUSW]. A picture of the Dior advertisement can be found at 
Richard H. Chused, Onassis Publicity Rights, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.
rhchused.com/Moments14.html [http://perma.cc/M4G6-FF5H] (last visited Sept. 28, 
2015). 
168 Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). One of the ads is 
available online. (Mostly) Fan Made Ford Ads, 2008 Mercury Sable Commercial, 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 12, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YUiMiox0WP0 [http://
perma.cc/ZJV6-S2CZ]. The story is told in GENELLE BELMAS & WAYNE OVERBECK, 
MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 214 (2012). It’s worth comparing the Midler dispute 
with Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F. 2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970). Here, too, the 
advertiser had purchased the right to use the song, “These Boots Are Made For 
Walking,” made famous by Nancy Sinatra, without obtaining the singer’s consent. But 
the voice imitation, if you dare to call it that, did not sound much like Sinatra. Though 
many people watching the ad certainly thought of Sinatra because of the music, it was 
difficult to contend that her persona was used in the ad itself. In both Midler and Sinatra, 
rights to use the music itself were purchased by the advertiser. 
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well beyond any legitimate boundary line to crimp creativity and 
public commentary.169 
There are at least two justifications for the right of publicity. 
First, use of a person’s image, a likeness of a person, a spot-on imi-
tation, or the name of a person in a sales pitch connotes an en-
dorsement of the product by the personality appearing or seeming 
to appear in the pitch. That, of course, is the primary reason for 
using a well-known person’s likeness in an ad—it helps sell prod-
ucts. But such non-consensual use can, at times, be pernicious. 
Bette Midler, for example, has never agreed to participate in a 
product advertisement.170 To undermine such a course of conduct 
attacks one of the core values she adheres to in her business life. 
Second, even if a personality does, from time to time, appear in 
ads, those decisions presumably are made with consent and, typi-
cally, for compensation. Why should a company be able to obtain 
the services of a well-known personage for free? Those who reap 
where they have not sown typically are treated badly in business 
tort jurisprudence. It is this commercial use standard—often a 
stand-in for trademark—that is embodied most clearly in the New 
York privacy statutes relied upon by the Fosters. But the state’s 
                                                                                                                            
169 There now are many examples of publicity rights “overreaching.” Two are enough 
to make the point. One is the famous case of Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts Inc., 579 F.2d 215 
(2d Cir. 1978), involving a poster of Elvis Presley released shortly after his death. The 
successor in interest of Presley’s estate claimed control over the use of his fame, a 
position supported by the court. There were two serious flaws with the result, putting 
aside the issue of whether publicity rights should survive the death of the famous person. 
First, copyright in the picture used in the poster was not held by Presley’s estate and the 
photo was legitimately taken at a concert. Allowing publicity rights to control its use 
should have been preempted under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). Second, 
and most important, the poster was simply a picture of Presley. It was not used as a come 
on to buy another item. That is not the sort of story normally governed by publicity rights. 
Another, and arguably more egregious result, was White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th 
Cir. 1992). Vanna White, the letter turner on Wheel of Fortune, was made fun of in a 
Samsung ad that had a woman of similar stature dressed up as a robot turning letters. 
Though the parody of White was very funny, the court found its use in an ad a violation of 
her publicity rights. Why humor was not permitted is hard to discern. White, after all, 
really does play the part of a robot on Wheel of Fortune. The ad certainly cannot be taken 
as an endorsement by White of Samsung products. 
170 Terri Eileen Hilliard, Advertisers Beware: Bette Midler Doesn’t Want to Dance, 9 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 43 (1989). 
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courts have steadfastly held to a rule that a likeness must be used to 
boost sales of a product other than the picture itself.171 
That is a sensible result, for some secretly taken pictures create 
no significant privacy intrusion problems, and others do. Creative 
photographers and artists often should be allowed to shoot, draw, 
paint, and then sell scenes with people in them—even recognizable 
people—without seeking permission. The fact that one person 
makes money by using the likeness of another person found in a 
public place typically does not suffice by itself to support a suit 
claiming violation of privacy or publicity rights. The well-known 
photographer Jesse Kalisher, for example, is most proud of an im-
age he took, reproduced online, of a woman he does not know 
standing in front of the Mona Lisa.172★ Surely he is not barred from 
selling this picture just because it features another person in a pub-
lic space. Nor is marketing of the many pictures of people quietly 
sitting in a room of paintings by Rothko—an artist renowned for 
inducing contemplative, “private” viewing—barred. In fact, fasci-
nating results appear if you do a Google image search using the 
                                                                                                                            
171 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2009). The statute was adopted in 
1903 in response to the public furor created by the decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding 
Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). A picture of Abigail Roberson, not a well-known 
personality, was used to advertise flour. Neither the picture nor its use was consensual. 
Twenty-five thousand copies were displayed all over the state. The new Court of Appeals 
refused to create a common law privacy or publicity rights theory to impose liability. A 
contrary, and now famous, result was reached three years later in Georgia. Pavesich v. New 
England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
172★ On his website he writes, 
After a bit, I decided to step back from the crowd and just take in the 
room. My camera, at this point, was hanging around my neck and I 
was merely observing the ebb and flow of people. That’s when this 
woman walked past me. I’m asked often . . . so for the record: I don’t 
know who this woman is, I have never met her, never spoke to her, 
and I did not ask her to walk in front of me. It just happened. Luckily, 
I did notice her incredible resemblance to the famous painting, lifted 
my camera and got off one shot. I like to joke that this picture should 
put my kids through college . . . it is certainly one of the shots of 
which I’m most proud. Oh, and if anyone knows who this woman is, 
by all means, please tell me . . . . 
Jesse Kalisher, Mona Lisa at the Mona Lisa (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.kalisher.com/
photo_blog/?p=4 [http://perma.cc/ABL3-GNFP]. The image is also available at Richard 
H. Chused, Kalisher Image, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/
Moments15.html [http://perma.cc/C7ER-EH6T] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
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phrase “contemplating Rothko.”173★ Some of the pictures are both 
beautiful and thought provoking. 
While the pictures of the Fosters were for sale before they were 
removed during the litigation,174 the images were not used to sell 
another product. Nor did Svenson’s compositions imply in any 
way that the Fosters or other residents of The Zinc were endorsing 
commercial activity; quite the contrary was the case. And since the 
Fosters were unknown figures, Svenson certainly was not reaping 
where others had sown. Their “fame” was not a basis for sale of 
any photographs. Only Svenson’s creative talents led people to buy 
an image. If those sales are to be constrained in any way, it must be 
for reasons other than the simple presence of an image of a human 
being. 
Finally, the notion that something called “privacy” involves 
arenas where we have an expectation of non-intrusiveness doesn’t 
help much for at least two groups of reasons—one involving the 
settings in which the phrase typically is used, and the other arising 
from the limitations now imposed on its use in a private law con-
text. First, the phrase “expectation of privacy” most commonly 
arises where a private party is attempting to use the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution to constrain government action.175 
                                                                                                                            
173★ One site that pops up is a review of a 2012 Rothko exhibit at the Portland, Oregon 
Museum of Art. The page contains a number of images of people looking at Rothkos, 
including one displayed on my website, see Richard H. Chused, Contemplating Rothko, 
APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments16.html 
[http://perma.cc/5U7G-4NV9] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). See also Rothko: Portland Art 
Museum, TRAVELMARX (June 25, 2012), http://blog.travelmarx.com/2012/06/rothko-
portland-art-museum.html [http://perma.cc/J9XA-FCCC]. There also is a famous 
Rothko Chapel in Houston. ROTHKO CHAPEL, http://rothkochapel.org 
[http://perma.cc/9MG7-UZAQ] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). An almost equally well-
known Rothko Room at the Philips Museum in Washington, D.C. with signs explicitly 
requesting viewers to view the paintings in quiet contemplation. The Rothko Room, 
PHILLIPS COLLECTION, http://www.phillipscollection.org/collection/rothko-room 
[http://perma.cc/9DD6-XB68] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
174 Martha Foster claimed in an affidavit filed in the case that the pictures were for sale 
for $5,000 to $7,500. Affidavit of Martha G. Foster in Support of Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction ¶ 5, Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 5, 2013). 
175 Its first major incarnation was in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). He concluded that protection flowed from two 
conditions—“that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
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It asks what parts of our environment should be free from unrea-
sonable intrusion because we “expect” the government to stay 
out.176 Police, for example, are allowed to peer into virtually any un-
obstructed place.177 It would be almost impossible, therefore, for 
the Fosters to bar government use in a criminal case of a photo-
graph taken through their window. Still, enforcement authorities 
may not typically enter a private residence without good reasons or 
a warrant. 
A fairly recent example is Kyllo v. United States.178 The Su-
preme Court concluded that the warrantless use of a thermal detec-
tor to scan the inside of a home for possible use of lamps to grow 
marijuana violated the Fourth Amendment.179 Justice Scalia wrote: 
We have held that visual observation is no “search” 
at all—perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more 
intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are 
presumptively unconstitutional. In assessing when a 
search is not a search, we have applied somewhat in 
reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). Katz involved 
eavesdropping by means of an electronic listening 
device placed on the outside of a telephone booth—
a location not within the catalog (“persons, houses, 
papers, and effects”) that the Fourth Amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches. We held 
that the Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected 
Katz from the warrantless eavesdropping because 
he “justifiably relied” upon the privacy of the tele-
phone booth. As Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted con-
currence described it, a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when the government violates a subjective 
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as 
                                                                                                                            
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
[objectively] ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361. 
176 See id. 
177 See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234–35, 239 (1986) 
(holding that an aerial viewing of Dow facilities by environmental regulations was not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
178 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
179 Id. at 41. 
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reasonable. We have subsequently applied this prin-
ciple to hold that a Fourth Amendment search does 
not occur—even when the explicitly protected loca-
tion of a house is concerned—unless “the individu-
al manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the object of the challenged search,” and “society 
[is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasona-
ble.” We have applied this test in holding that it is 
not a search for the police to use a pen register at 
the phone company to determine what numbers 
were dialed in a private home, and we have applied 
the test on two different occasions in holding that 
aerial surveillance of private homes and surrounding 
areas does not constitute a search.180 
In reading passages like this, it is clear that the Court was con-
cerned about overly constraining police enforcement actions. Ex-
pectations of privacy must be held not only by the party intruded 
upon but also by society at large.181★ Though the rule’s wisdom is 
subject to serious questions, it has long been understood that areas 
open to sightlines or items held by third parties are not protected 
by the Fourth Amendment.182 Once something is visible to anyone 
                                                                                                                            
180 Id. at 32–33. The same basic outcome may be gleaned from Bond v. United States, 529 
U.S. 334 (2000) and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). In Bond, the Court suppressed 
methamphetamine found in a soft bag. A Border Patrol Agent had squeezed the bag after 
boarding a bus to check the immigration status of the riders, but lacked any reasons to 
believe that Bond was carrying illegal substances. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338–39. On the other 
hand, the use of a helicopter to perform exterior searches from a height of 400 feet was 
approved in Riley. The helicopter search allowed a county sheriff to see into the interior 
of a greenhouse. The information gained led to the issuance of a search warrant and the 
arrest of Riley for growing marijuana. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52. Bond was said to be a case 
about unlawful intrusion, and Riley about using information obtained from an 
unobstructed view through windows. 
181★ To test your sensibilities, look at a thermal image of the White House at Richard H. 
Chused, Thermal Imaging, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/
Moments17.html [http://perma.cc/A62R-Q3PK] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). The 
British Gas image was published in 2010. Suzanne Goldenberg, Barack Obama’s $5bn 
Green Home Plan to Boost Economy Gets Off to a Slow Start, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/feb/19/weatherisation-energy-efficiency-
us-recovery-plan [http://perma.cc/8UKC-EW6X]. 
182 For a recent, thought provoking, privacy driven assessment of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Bryan Choi, For Whom the Data 
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other than the rights claimant, it loses its constitutional protec-
tions. 
These sorts of norms may not rationally be applied in the Fos-
ter/Svenson setting. The most obvious reason is that the privacy 
expectation rubric itself has lost connection with reality. The way 
the various branches of the government obtain personal informa-
tion no longer allows for much, if any, expectation of privacy. The 
rule allowing the government to use information or objects visible 
to third parties, regardless of how they obtained it, places an 
enormous realm of “private” information and data outside consti-
tutional boundaries. The vast wealth of online data, all routinely 
searchable by government authorities, makes a mockery of the idea 
that our expectations about the ways “private” information should 
be used by public authorities has any relationship to its actual use. 
The widespread knowledge that the government routinely searches 
a great deal of our supposedly private physical, electronic, and 
psychic spaces makes any notion of privacy based on intrusion into 
physical places or territories seem preposterous. But most impor-
tantly, the Foster/Svenson dispute does not involve any expectations 
about the use or abuse of government power. It asks quite different 
questions about human interactions outside the arenas of govern-
ment security and enforcement authority. That is critically impor-
tant, for sometimes, the government may justifiably intrude in ways 
individuals may not, while in other instances, individuals may ven-
ture where the government is barred.183 
Second, there are many parts of our lives that are routinely vis-
ible to the general public, but traditional civil privacy law does not 
bar the media from using information once it is publicly available—
regardless of our expectations.184 The impact of that rule on the 
                                                                                                                            
Tolls: A Reunified Theory of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 37 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 185 (2015). 
183 For example, a police office may often stop a person on the street and seek 
information, make an arrest or perform a search. Those not involved in law enforcement 
may not take such steps. On the other hand, a spouse or parent typically may open any 
closet in her or his residence, even if another occupant is the primary user of the space. 
Police may not take such actions without quite specific permission or reasons. This 
Article is not about government-citizen contacts, but citizen-citizen contacts. 
184 The principle early case is Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). The 
Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment barred providing an invasion of 
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Fosters is not clear. Leaving the blinds up or curtains open in our 
apartments doesn’t necessarily invite prying eyes to look, but it 
doesn’t bar them either. Indeed, walking around New York at night 
often is a visual delight for those who enjoy seeing how residents 
have decorated or remodeled apartment interiors in the sometimes 
nondescript buildings that line the city’s streets and avenues. We 
have no pure privacy expectations from prying eyes in such set-
tings, but we may still conclude—despite our open confession that 
we often make the interiors of our abodes visible to those outside 
our living spaces—that some distributions of photographs of our 
home-based happenings is inappropriate. It is not that we have any 
expectation that peering into a place is off limits to third parties, 
but rather that we might reasonably hope to limit the ways such 
peering may be used. It is not just, or even, the intrusion that is at 
issue. It is the entire context surrounding what people do with their 
ability to appropriate moments in other people’s lives. Something 
other than or in addition to expectations of privacy must be at 
work. 
There are, of course, similar problems in the electronic world. 
Indeed, the more we learn about the scope of intrusive actions by 
both public and private entities, the less relevant does the “expec-
tation of privacy” rubric become. There no longer can be a cultural 
belief that our personal lives are invisible or unavailable to others. 
We hope that much of what we deposit in online data clouds, say 
on a telephone, or send in a text message or email stays private. But 
we know that even the best-intentioned cloud manager makes mis-
takes or fails to detect hacking. And we also know that much of 
what we post or send online easily may escape into the world or 
government data caches. Granting only “friends” access to pic-
tures and videos on Facebook hardly guarantees that they will re-
main visible just to that group. One right-click of a mouse allows 
any “friend” to save such an image and then to send it to others. 
The lack of privacy expectations, however, does not mean that eve-
                                                                                                                            
privacy cause of action against a broadcast outlet to the father of a rape victim when state 
law barred the release of the victim’s name but reporters discovered it in public records. 
The same basic result emerged a some years later in another Florida case, Florida Star v. 
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). Further discussion of this issue may be found in later 
segments of this Article, see infra note 239. 
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rything about us that is visible to some machine or person—
whether online or not—should be available for appropriation or use 
in all circumstances. That, of course, is the problem confronted 
here. 
B. Reconstructing Intrusive Privacy Violations 
The traditional rules don’t ask the right questions. Just as in the 
age of Warren and Brandeis, technology has dramatically altered 
the ways in which moments may be appropriated, and perhaps 
even more importantly, distributed. In the case of Svenson’s 
Neighbors exhibition, images were displayed not only on the walls of 
a gallery, but also online. So it is not just the traditional notion of 
intrusion that is at issue. The ways in which incursions manifest 
themselves in the world after a moment is appropriated also are 
relevant. In the view of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to say 
nothing of the traditional construction of the Fourth Amendment, 
it is the intrusion that is the harm.185 That is no longer the appro-
priate measure for the nature of the interests that need protection. 
Contemporary issues are much more complex than in the 1970s 
when the Restatement (Second) was written and Katz was decided. 
We should applaud, rather than bemoan, the possibility that similar 
sorts of intrusions might produce quite different legal results—
dependent at times upon what happens after the intrusion itself 
occurs. Bright line rules no longer serve us very well. As Daniel So-
love186 and Helen Nissenbaum187 have correctly noted, privacy law 
needs to be thickly contextualized—each case placed in a deeply 
fact-based setting. Though writing about technology-based privacy 
issues, Helen Nissenbaum aptly framed the problem. 
The framework of contextual integrity maintains 
that the indignation, protest, discomfit, and resis-
tance to technology-based information systems and 
practices . . . invariably can be traced to breaches of 
context-relative information norms. . . . Context-
relative informational norms are characterized by 
four key parameters: context, actors, attributes and 
                                                                                                                            
185 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
186 See SOLOVE, supra note 22, at 39–41. 
187 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 22, at 140–43, 186–230. 
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transmission principles. Generally, they prescribe, 
for a given context, the types of information, the 
parties who are the subjects of the information as 
well as those who are sending and receiving it, and 
the principles under which this information is 
transmitted.188 
That means that it is not merely the way images are obtained, 
but also the entire setting in which that event occurs and plays out 
over time. We need to consider the nature of the observation by the 
photographer, the methods used to obtain the information, the 
physical setting in which the observation occurs, the dissemination 
and distribution of the information, and the way the information is 
used.189 Though such factor-based analytical structures reduce the 
ability of relevant actors to predict dispute outcomes, they may 
produce much more appropriate results. At least for now, that sort 
of compromise is much better than the alternative. It makes more 
sense to seek fair resolutions of modern privacy disputes than to 
rigidly apply old rules that are losing their ability to cope with mod-
ern technological developments.190 
C. Resolving the Foster Dispute 
So, allow me a stab at resolving the Foster case. I suggest that 
when the entire context of the Foster situation is taken into ac-
count, a strong argument may be made that Svenson’s behavior 
was inappropriate. First, the observation was obtained surrepti-
tiously and without express consent. Second, the non-consensually 
taken images were shot from the shadows of Svenson’s apartment 
using a camera with the capacity to zoom in on the subjects. Third, 
the images were taken of people during the routines of their daily 
lives and in the confines of their homes above street level. Fourth, 
Svenson did not just record the digital images and save them for his 
personal use; he also composed images, blew them up and arranged 
                                                                                                                            
188 Id. at 140–41. 
189 A similar point is made by Jane Yakowitz Bambauer in The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 204, 211–13 (2012). 
190 One of the finest articles about the constantly changing tension between bright line 
and flexible rules is Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
577 (1988). 
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for their display in both a gallery and on a web site. Finally, the two 
images the Fosters sued over displayed the faces of their children. 
Is it appropriate for this sort of photographic endeavor to use child-
ren as its subjects? Let’s review each of these factors to discover if 
they construct an edifice. 
1. The Consent Conundrum 
Those in Svenson’s view finder had no idea they were being 
photographed from the shadows of his loft and no way of finding 
out unless the images were publicly displayed or the serendipity 
gods intervened. That may well not be enough by itself to penalize 
him. Many images captured without the knowledge and consent of 
the subject are not—and should not—be considered privacy prob-
lems. Conversely, images obtained consensually but later distri-
buted without permission might raise serious concerns. It is not 
that the presence or absence of consent determines the appropriate 
result in every context, but only that it alters the context. If Sven-
son, for example, had knocked on the doors of his neighbors’ 
apartments, described his project, and obtained their permission to 
take pictures for a period of time without further bargaining, it is 
hard to imagine that any legal repercussions should follow. Taking 
a picture of someone with their consent, regardless of the setting in 
which the photograph is made, is typically legitimate. Consent, in 
short, is highly likely to prevent privacy litigation about the mere 
creation of an image.191 Its absence, however, leaves the door open 
for later disputation—if the context is right. 
On the other hand, obtaining consent to do one thing doesn’t 
automatically carry with it permission to do another. Even if Sven-
son obtained consent to aim his camera into an apartment and take 
a picture, it is not clear that such permission carries distributional 
rights with it. Lack of consent may by itself raise a red flag, but 
presence of consent to take a picture doesn’t automatically carry 
with it control over all uses of the image.192 Later actions, there-
                                                                                                                            
191 Note well that this discussion is only about the taking of a picture, not what is done 
with it. The question of consent, of course, may extend beyond the creation stage, but 
that simply moves the context further down the decisional matrix. 
192 I am putting aside copyright issues here. Typically, the owner of the copyright in an 
image has the right to sell and exploit it. But if a photograph is taken in violation of 
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fore, may create quite complex problems. Taking pictures or videos 
of intimate behavior with the agreement of all adult participants in 
the episode may be unwise, but is usually legal. Distribution of the 
images to others, however, may create a wholly different context. 
Revenge porn is the obvious example.193 More mundane consent 
issues surface in an array of contexts. Consider, for example, the 
Google Street View controversies brewing in Europe.194 While 
there are some European rulings suggesting that the non-
consensual taking of pictures of people by roving equipment and 
the placement of the images online are privacy invasions, the prob-
lem disappears if appropriate consent is obtained. Walking down 
the street while your picture is taken in the United States has not 
yet been deemed a problem, but clearly the lack of consent may 
lead to disputes in settings where obtaining permission obviates 
them. Given changes in context, the lack of consent may be telling. 
The meaning of consent itself also is a major problem. While 
express grants of permission typically remove privacy concerns if 
the terms of the consent are clear,195 the dispute with Svenson and 
                                                                                                                            
privacy rights, those rights may trump the right to exploit the intellectual property 
interests. Think about up-skirt or Peeping Tom photographs: surely the ownership of a 
copyright in the picture taker doesn’t justify bestowing distribution rights in the images. 
Such disputes may raise interesting preemption issues not taken up here. 
193 There have been a number of major controversies in recent years about the 
distribution of consensually taken intimate videos after the sexual partners separate. One 
of the most serious involved the conviction of Kevin Bollaert for identity theft and 
extortion arising out of the operation of two revenge porn websites. Nicky Woolf, San 
Diego Jury Convicts Revenge-Porn Website Operator Kevin Bollaert, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 
2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2015/feb/03/revenge-porn-web
site-operator-convicted-san-diego-kevin-bollaert [http://perma.cc/65T9-KBVX]. 
194 For a survey of the different rules in the United States and Europe in this area, see 
Geissler, supra note 166, at 897. There are very few cases in the United States. In the 
absence of trespass claims or allegations that Google equipment picked up and stored 
signals from open wireless systems, the courts have not found any privacy problems. See 
Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013); Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 
695, rev’d on other grounds, 362 F. App’x 273 (3d Cir. 2010). 
195 Problems, of course, can occur here as well, for “express” consent to use an image 
may be obtained under tenuous circumstances. On February 25, 2015, my wife and I 
attended a concert in a small space at Lincoln Center to listen to music from Bach’s 
magnificent Cello Suites. We ordered and paid for the tickets online and picked them up 
on arrival at the venue. The back of each ticket contained typical provisions designating 
them as licenses, but they also contained the following provision: 
This event may be recorded (by audiovisual or photographic means), 
and such recordings may include pictures of the audience or 
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the issues that might surface from the actions of Wolf or Iverson 
involve puzzling notions of constructive consent. Svenson’s images 
were obtained through open windows across a fairly narrow street. 
Using his words, Svenson took that as a sign that “there is no ques-
tion of privacy.”196 When New Yorkers living in buildings with 
large windows leave their curtains open or shades up, does that 
connote consent for others to look inside? Surely the answer some-
times must be “yes!” Walking down any street, especially at night, 
often opens to public view the interiors of first floor apartments or 
bottom levels of town houses. It would be absurd to contend that 
residents who leave their windows uncovered assume that no one 
ever looks inside. Indeed, we are told we must assume that gov-
ernment authorities always have the right to look! 
My photograph while walking the High Line on May 15, 2015. 
The apartment building is The Caledonia at 450 West 17th Street. 
                                                                                                                            
individuals in the audience. Your attendance at the event shall be 
deemed your consent to appear in such recordings and to the 
unlimited exploitation of such recordings in any and all media now 
known or hereafter devised. 
If someone’s image is used in a video recording, is its use any more consensual than the 
use of an image of the Fosters by Svenson? 
196 These words are taken from his description of The Neighbors exhibition. 
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Or what of those who purchase glass walled apartments directly 
abutting or easily visible from the pedestrian level of the High 
Line197 a magnificent walking park that meanders mostly mid-block 
above street level between 13th and 34th Streets on the west side of 
Manhattan on the bed of an old freight train trestle.198★ Owners of 
apartments by the High Line are regularly both gazers of the pass-
ing people parade and objects of attention by those sauntering by. 
Some, as they admitted when interviewed, recognized that pur-
chasing units at park level involved loss of privacy. They expected 
to have eye contact—if not discourse—with those walking by. 
Some even greet park visitors like kids wave at fire trucks. Others 
in buildings by the High Line claimed they intentionally avoided 
buying lower level units.199 
Do those of us living well above street (or park) level confront 
similar issues? Must we assume that some residents living across 
the street in equally tall buildings peer out of their windows, some-
times with binoculars or telescopes? Telescopes are not sold in a 
city like New York, where the stars rarely shine, unless there is a 
market for them. Consent in this and other urban contexts becomes 
ambiguous, if not meaningless. The traditional rubric about “ex-
pectation of privacy”—in many ways a proxy for consent—loses 
contact with the reality of daily life in cities. The issue is not only 
whether we grant our neighbors consent to peer inside when our 
shades are up but what we give consent for under such circums-
tances. Looking is one thing; staring is another. Taking a picture is 
one thing; taking a picture with a telephoto lens is another. Looking 
inside for a period of time is one thing; making a video is another. 
Here too, the context is critical. Even if taking a picture with a tele-
photo lens equipped camera through an unobstructed window is 
                                                                                                                            
197 Visit the park website at FRIENDS OF THE HIGHLINE, http://www.thehighline.org/ 
[http://perma.cc/FJR6-NVZ8] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). The High Line runs from 
Gansevoort Street on the south next to the new Whitney Museum of American Art in the 
Meatpacking District northwest of Greenwich Village, and ends at 34th Street after 
circling around the enormous Hudson Yards development now being constructed over 
the train yards west of Pennsylvania Station. 
198★ I walked part of the High Line on May 15, 2015 and took a few pictures of apartment 
buildings, including that of The Caledonia displayed at Richard H. Chused, The High 
Line, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, www.rhchused.com/Moments18.html [http://perma.
cc/LE9E-MJX6] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
199 See Steven Kurutz, Close Quarters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2012, at D1. 
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constructively consensual, what is done with that photo after it’s 
taken may be unacceptable. The more extensive the duration, mag-
nification, and distribution of the imaging, the less likely it is that 
constructing consent from the presence of an unobstructed view is 
appropriate. Would it really be acceptable for a videographer to 
hide a camera in a bush on the High Line and take hours of movies 
of those in an apartment? Who should have the burden of obstruct-
ing the view—the videographer by stopping the camera or the resi-
dent by pulling down the shades? Surely it cannot be that we must 
live behind stone walls in order to avoid inappropriate appropria-
tion of moments in our lives.200★ 
The point is well made by an old example of the problem—
Peeping Tom statutes.201 New York, for example, criminalizes un-
lawful surveillance under a fairly modern statute adopted in 2003 
and recently amended. Here is one of its provisions: 
A person is guilty of unlawful surveillance in the 
second degree when . . . [f]or his or her own, or 
another person’s amusement, entertainment, or 
profit, or for the purpose of degrading or abusing a 
person, he or she intentionally uses or installs, or 
permits the utilization or installation of an imaging 
device to surreptitiously view, broadcast or record a 
person dressing or undressing or the sexual or other 
intimate parts of such person at a place and time 
                                                                                                                            
200★ Another photograph I took of an unremodeled structure from the High Line in 2012 
before the recent deluge of new buildings went up displays what use of cement blocks to 
avoid gazing might look like. See Richard H. Chused, Cement Blocks, APPROPRIATE(D) 
MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments19.html [http://perma.cc/M9H5-37FV] 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
201 About half the states have voyeurism or “Peeping Tom” statutes. See Timothy J. 
Horstmann, Protecting Traditional Privacy Rights in a Brave New Digital World: The Threat 
Posed by Cellular Phone-Cameras and What States Should Do To Stop It, 111 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 739 (2007). The phrase “Peeping Tom” comes from a legend of 11th century 
Coventry in England. Lady Godiva, the wife of Leforic III, Earl of Mercia, urged her 
husband to reduce the burdensome taxes on the town. He agreed if she would ride naked 
from one end of Mercia to the other. She agreed, so the story goes, and successfully 
persuaded all the residents to avert their eyes as she did so. The first mention that a man 
named Tom peeked doesn’t appear until the 18th century, but that addition to the legend 
became the basis for our modern phraseology. See Charles Coe, Lady Godiva: The Naked 
Truth, HARV. MAG. (July–Aug. 2003), http://harvardmagazine.com/2003/07/lady-
godiva-the-naked-tr.html [http://perma.cc/R27D-2CXL]. 
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when such person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, without such person’s knowledge or con-
sent.202 
The statute is highly contextualized and presumes consent is 
absent. The picture taker must have the intent to amuse him or 
herself, to profit from the activity, or to degrade or abuse another 
person. And the image taking that is barred relates only to sexually 
oriented materials obtained when a person is in an area where dis-
robing typically proceeds privately. I mention this sort of statute 
not because it applies to Svenson’s setting: it doesn’t—at least as 
far as I can tell.203 But it clearly demonstrates the perils of ending 
discussion of privacy issues once we know whether actions were 
taken with or without consent or whether pictures were taken 
through unshaded windows. Concluding that Svenson would have 
invaded the Fosters’ privacy if he surreptitiously peered into their 
bedroom while they were undressing does not compel us to reach 
similar conclusions if he photographed them chatting in their living 
room. Clearly the nature of the picture taking also is important. 
2. The Nature of the Picture Taking 
The sometimes ambiguous quality of consent is particularly re-
levant in the Svenson setting—large windows, blinds or shades up, 
curtains open, people making themselves visible. While express 
consent was never obtained, there almost surely was some unquan-
tifiable level of permission granted to look inside, so the details of 
the picture taking become critically important. The more secretive 
and intrusive the viewing, the more willing we should be to con-
demn the activity. In this case, Svenson commented—perhaps 
gloated—about taking pictures from the shadows of his loft. It is 
worth repeating his description of the project. 
For my subjects there is no question of privacy; they 
are performing behind a transparent scrim on a 
                                                                                                                            
202 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.45 (McKinney 2009). Elsewhere in the statute is this 
definition: “‘Place and time when a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy’ . . . 
mean[s] a place and time when a reasonable person would believe that he or she could 
fully disrobe in privacy.” PENAL § 250.40. 
203 One image does appear to have been taken into a bedroom, but other requirements of 
the statute probably are not met. See discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
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stage of their own creation with the curtain raised 
high. The Neighbors don’t know they are being pho-
tographed; I carefully shoot from the shadows of my 
home into theirs. I am not unlike the birder, quietly 
waiting for hours, watching for the flutter of a hand 
or the movement of a curtain as an indication that 
there is life within.204 
There are several qualities of this text that are disturbing—that 
connote a much more intrusive frame of reference than a momen-
tary glimpse or even spontaneous picture taking through an unob-
structed window. Though his intent probably was unlike that re-
quired by New York’s anti-surveillance statute, Svenson took pre-
cautions to avoid being seen by those he was photographing. He 
waited for significant periods of time hoping that an interesting 
scene would develop. Deploying the word “stalking” probably 
pushes too far, for there is no evidence he harbored any malicious 
feelings towards those he was watching. But “stakeout” catches 
the mood—a long-term period of watching and hoping.205 At some 
ineffable point, peering into the apartment of another morphs from 
acceptable—sometimes even welcomed—urban behavior to unne-
cessary and unacceptable intrusion. Reactions of this sort also are 
appropriate after looking at both Michelle Iverson’s work and her 
artist statement. Combine a lengthy stare at night with equipment 
that enlarges the image and makes events and people more visible 
and the context becomes more difficult to justify. The lack of con-
sent takes on added significance in such a setting. Taking a quick 
shot through an open window may be one thing. “Hanging out” 
waiting for something to happen may be quite another.206 
                                                                                                                            
204 Gorence, supra note 4. 
205 As already noted, police may make use of information obtained by gazing into 
unobstructed spaces. Why shouldn’t that automatically connote that Svenson’s actions 
were perfectly legitimate? On the surface, at least, it seems that the potential harm to the 
parties being staked out (criminal prosecution) is greater than any result someone like 
Svenson may produce. The difference, I suggest, lies in the public purposes served by the 
two intruders. Criminal prosecutions are brought to protect the public from harm. 
Svenson, however, cannot serve as a proxy for that sort of public goal. He may, of course, 
further First Amendment goals. See discussion infra Part III.D.2. 
206 At some level, Iverson realized the controversial nature of her work. In an interview 
of her, see Weingart, supra note 14, she noted that a stroller saw her sitting her in her car 
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3.  The Scenes Taken 
Though many of the views Svenson snapped through the 
apartment windows of The Zinc and used in his exhibition were 
partially or totally unobstructed by shades or blinds, the scenes 
captured were sometimes quite startling. Two images from the ex-
hibition not involving the Fosters best raise the issues. One—
Neighbors #5—shows a woman on her hands and knees. There are 
objects in the background suggesting she is assembling some furni-
ture or cabinets. Her rear end faces the viewer.207 It was hung 
greatly enlarged at the Julie Saul Gallery. An image of it with a man 
staring at it was published in news reports.208 Several thoughts 
come to mind. First, Svenson’s image is particularly suggestive. 
Though the person in the photograph is identifiable only by people 
who know her, the position of her body is not one most women 
would typically want others to stare at, regardless of whether the 
viewing occurs only with the naked eye, with the aid of an enlarge-
ment device or telephoto lens equipped camera, in a gallery, or on-
line.209 The thought of someone hiding in the shadows of their 
apartment waiting for someone across the street to assume such a 
position is disturbing. Another image is troubling for related but 
somewhat different reasons. It depicts a woman wearing a robe sit-
ting on her bed with her back to the camera. There is a towel 
wrapped around her head—presumably drying wet hair—and she 
is looking down at and using an object (perhaps a cell phone) in her 
                                                                                                                            
with a camera and approached her. Rather than deal with him, she quickly drove away. 
Why? 
207 This image is available at The Neighbors, ARNE SVENSON, http://arnesvenson.com/
theneighbors.html [http://perma.cc/5HP8-YAB3] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). I have 
elected not to show it here. 
208 A Fox News article about the case contained the scene. NYC Artist’s Secret Photos of 
Neighbors Raise Privacy Issues; For Some, ‘A Line Crossed,’ FOX NEWS (May 17, 2013), 
http://www.foxnews.com/leisure/2013/05/17/nyc-artist-secret-photos-neighbors-raise-
privacy-issues-for-some-line-crossed [http://perma.cc/U9TR-CZGK]. 
209 In discussions I’ve had with Muslim women students about gender separation in 
mosques, one issue that has surfaced is their concern about being watched by men when 
they pray with their foreheads on the floor in a crouching position. Putting aside the 
philosophical and religious issues raised by gender segregation in places of worship, I can 
understand the cultural and social problems associated with taking such positions in front 
of men. 
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hand.210 It comes perilously close to violating the Peeping Tom 
surveillance statute, though Svenson probably lacked the requisite 
intent to trigger a criminal prosecution. Nonetheless, it is difficult 
to believe this is an image most women would care to have publicly 
distributed.211 
Other photographs raise similar problems in less intensive 
ways. One displays the lower parts of the torsos and legs of a man 
and an obviously pregnant woman sitting across from each other 
with their legs on an ottoman while they are dressed in their 
robes.212 Another pictures a napping man lying on his side with his 
back to the window and part of his lower back exposed to view.213 
In each case, Svenson appropriated particularly personal mo-
ments—ones where we all may have serious qualms about the pro-
priety of someone staring through a window for a significant period 
of time and capturing such poses. The content may not by itself be 
enough to justify calling them invasions of privacy, but when com-
bined with the lack of clear consent and the nature of the photogra-
phy process, the potential for impropriety rises. 
4. Display and Distribution 
Ironically, or perhaps perversely, the Fosters did not feel or 
sense intrusion in the absence of knowledge generated by the public 
display and distribution of Svenson’s images. Though his artistic 
                                                                                                                            
210 See SVENSON, supra note 2, at Neighbors #14; Neighbors #14, JULIE SAUL GALLERY, 
http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-svenson/neighbors#17 [http://perma.cc/R875-
GCNY] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
211 It may be worth noting that most of the Svenson pictures posted on the Gallery 
website were of women. Of the twenty-five on the site, fourteen featured female subjects, 
four male, two of both men and women, one was unclear, and five had neither. Though 
these numbers may suggest Svenson has a particular interest in taking pictures of women, 
it also is possible that they simply demonstrate that women are more likely to be at home 
during the day when most of the photographs were taken. It also is interesting that 
Svenson did not display any nudity in his pictures. It is certainly not outlandish to assume 
that unclothed or partially unclothed people appeared in his view finder from time to 
time. Perhaps he declined to take such images. 
212 See SVENSON, supra note 2, at Neighbors #1; Neighbors #1, JULIE SAUL GALLERY, 
http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-svenson/neighbors#21 [http://
perma.cc/3AVL-BM44] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
213 See SVENSON, supra note 2, at Neighbors #11; Neighbors #11, JULIE SAUL GALLERY, 
http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-svenson/neighbors#5 [http://perma.cc/8UFZ-
AWZM] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
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instincts certainly make his actions understandable and at least par-
tially justifiable, the decision to move surreptitiously taken photo-
graphs into the public realm amplifies the impact of the intrusion in 
quite dramatic ways. That is particularly true today given the per-
vasiveness and speed of the digital world. Rather than leading to 
the loss of privacy rights in accordance with some traditional priva-
cy rules, the public display should be deemed to enhance the possi-
bility of obtaining relief from the party responsible for creating pub-
lic knowledge of the intrusion. In this case, the images were both 
displayed in a gallery and posted online. Each step has different and 
potentially troublesome consequences. 
First, consider the gallery exhibition. As the discussion of the 
image of a crouching woman working on her hands and knees 
makes clear, Svenson’s photographs were dramatically enlarged 
and hung in a spacious room. If, as suggested, there is something 
untoward about the nature of the images themselves, that effect is 
markedly amplified by the dramatic size and spacious setting used 
to display the pictures. When I displayed the exhibition picture of a 
man staring at the image of the rear of a crouching woman in front 
of my colleagues for a significant period of time while answering 
questions about an earlier draft of this paper, some in attendance 
got uneasy. One colleague noted that it was a bit unnerving to sit 
for twenty minutes watching a man with his back to the camera 
looking at the hindquarters of a woman working on her hands and 
knees. That’s a fair observation and it made me think deeply about 
whether I should show such images to anyone—whether in an edu-
cational setting or not. The gallery display not only made Sven-
son’s images available for public viewing, it also made it possible to 
stare at the images for as long as—or even longer—than Svenson 
stared through the windows of The Zinc building. He made it poss-
ible for others to experience the same feelings and emotions he may 
have felt as he waited in the shadows and took the pictures. As we 
look at the images, we become intruders just as he was. That, of 
course, was surely one of his artistic motivations: he wanted us to 
sense our own voyeuristic impulses. But that also accentuates the 
problems with his work. The very artistic sensibilities he played 
with are what raise privacy concerns. With each step along the path 
to the gallery show—looking across the street, waiting in shadows 
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for long periods of time, taking pictures, using a telephoto lens, 
capturing particularly touchy or intimate moments, enlarging the 
images, displaying the photographs publicly—the context becomes 
more seriously intrusive. 
It also is worth noting that a significant period of time did not 
elapse between the time the pictures were taken and displayed. If 
Walker Evans was justified in showing his surreptitious subway 
pictures twenty-five years after they were taken,214 or Judge Meyer 
was correct in allowing Frederick Wiseman to display Titicut Follies 
without restraint decades after it was originally filmed,215 those de-
cisions reinforce the likelihood that harm is more likely when se-
cretly obtained images of recognizable people are displayed within 
a short time of their taking. Unsurprisingly, both the Fosters and 
Kravetz were concerned not only about the way their images were 
captured on film, but also about the speedy public display of the 
appropriated moments. 
Both the gallery and Svenson took one more step: each made 
the photographs available online.216 Though the significant en-
largements made for the gallery were not duplicated online by a 
viewer’s use of a standard computer monitor,217 much of the rest of 
the impact of the gallery show is replicated. Viewers gain access to 
the pictures and the ability to look at them for as long as they wish. 
And, perhaps most importantly, once pictures find their way on-
line, it often is very difficult either to control their further distribu-
tion or to remove them. Though both the Julie Saul Gallery and 
Svenson took down the images of the Foster children while the liti-
gation was pending and the published exhibition book omitted both 
pictures, one of the photographs is now available on the gallery’s 
website.218 While the images were unavailable, I still managed to 
find them. The fairly widespread media discussions of the Fos-
ter/Svenson dispute also led to the distribution of exhibition images 
                                                                                                                            
214 See Sante, supra note 130. 
215 See Langner, supra note 137. 
216 See SVENSON, supra note 2; The Neighbors, supra note 2. 
217 That, of course, need not always be the case with computer based digital images. 
Many households now have the capacity to display pictures stored on a computer using 
very large monitors or huge television screens. 
218  See Neighbors #12, JULIE SAUL GALLERY, http://www.saulgallery.com/artists/arne-
svenson/neighbors#1 [http://perma.cc/VZ4H-9UJA] (last visited Dec. 21, 2015). 
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around the world.219 That speaks mountains about the nature of the 
contemporary digital realm and the ways in which privacy rules fo-
cusing only on an intrusion itself are short-sighted. Moving images 
to a website may mean they ride off on an unchartered, unpredicta-
ble, and uncontrollable journey. If they do, concerns about the me-
thods used to take the images in the first place are heightened. 
5. Children 
Both the Fosters and Kravetz were particularly upset by the 
presence of their children in the pictures taken by Svenson. It is 
clear that consent was not obtained and could not be constructed to 
allow taking pictures of the children under the circumstances of 
this case. They had nothing to do with leaving the shades up. Since 
their parents were totally unaware of what Svenson was doing, they 
were in no position to grant permission on behalf of their offspring, 
either actually or constructively. We often opine that parents have 
the right—even at a constitutional level—to make decisions on be-
half of their minor children.220 But it is difficult to see how that idea 
is triggered in a case like this. And even if parents sometimes may 
waive the privacy rights of their children, there is an open question 
about how extensive that right may be.221 It would, I think, be stret-
ching even an artificial notion of consent to allow Svenson to as-
sume he has the freedom to gain access to the lives of the 
youngsters just because he could see them through an open win-
dow. In short, even if he was justified in taking all the other photo-
graphs of adults, the two of the Foster children fell into a different 
category. When all the characteristics of the Svenson project are 
taken into account, therefore, there are strong arguments that pri-
vacy law should limit such activities. 
                                                                                                                            
219 I found them on English and German sites. There is, of course, deep irony in this 
result as well, for it was only because the Fosters publicly condemned Svenson’s work 
and then filed a lawsuit that the story gained widespread attention in the media. Should 
Svenson be held responsible for this? 
220 See, e.g., Troel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (discussing the parental right to 
control access to their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussing the 
right of parents to refuse using public schools for religious reasons); Pierce v. Soc’y of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (discussing the right of parents to send their children to 
private schools). 
221 See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Privacy for Children, 42 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 759 (2011). 
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D. An Elephant in the Room 
There is an elephant in the room that needs to be addressed. 
Bemoaning the intrusive methods of surveillance photographers 
like Svenson does not totally negate either the long artistic heritage 
of the genre or the importance of the artistic messages the genre 
presents to us. It goes without saying that an artist’s desire to pub-
licly comment upon the voyeuristic tendencies of the human 
psyche may fall within the ambit of the First Amendment. It there-
fore is not surprising that significant parts of privacy law and re-
lated doctrines are limited by free speech considerations. Media 
coverage placing a public person in a false light creates a viable tort 
action only when accompanied by malicious intent.222 The same is 
true in defamation cases—closely related to false light disputes.223 
That is understandable in both settings. The tort is based upon the 
qualities of speech itself, disconnected from any actions that may 
have been taken to create it. In such settings, requiring those seek-
ing relief to demonstrate significant intentional misbehavior is sens-
ible, but this sort of rule does not obviously apply to privacy torts 
involving intrusions. Though the images made and distributed by 
Svenson certainly carry some level of First Amendment protection 
with them, the methods by which the images were obtained do not 
evoke speech metaphors in the same way.224 It is difficult to claim 
that the First Amendment privileges taking a picture of an intimate 
space if the total context of the photographic adventure is inappro-
priate. Surely, for example, a picture taken and released for publi-
                                                                                                                            
222 See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374 (1967). Liability requires that the report be published with knowledge of its 
falsity or reckless disregard of its truth. 
223 Some contend that the false light tort serves no purpose different than defamation 
and should be abolished. See, e.g., Sandra F. Chance & Christina M. Locke, When Even the 
Truth Isn’t Good Enough: Judicial Inconsistency in False Light Cases Threatens Free Speech, 9 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 546 (2011). 
224 The speech versus action dichotomy, with the latter more easily regulated, is 
treacherous at best. Art “scenes” may stretch the distinction to the breaking point, 
whether we think of dance or Marina Abramovic sitting at a table in the lobby of the 
Museum of Modern Art staring at strangers for a period of time. See Jim Dwyer, 
Confronting a Stranger, For Art, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at MB1. Nonetheless, there are 
times when the Supreme Court has made use of the dichotomy, as when criminalizing 
draft card burning during the Vietnam War was approved. See United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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cation by an archetypical Peeping Tom could be suppressed even if 
it was aesthetically amazing. 
Dealing comprehensively with this issue would require a long 
exegesis. This Article already is lengthy. So my plan is to use just a 
few examples and cases to outline the basic contours of my conten-
tion that the First Amendment does not and should not bar or se-
verely constrain a claim by the Fosters that Svenson invaded their 
privacy. Compare three sets of well-known disputes. The first in-
volves the revelation by newspapers or television media of the 
names of rape victims or juvenile offenders despite state statutes 
barring the release of such information. In general, the Supreme 
Court has concluded that the First Amendment protects such ac-
tions by news media.225 Second, consider the very narrow degree to 
which the First Amendment restricts publicity rights claims. While 
using the likeness or name of a well-known person in a way unre-
lated to efforts to sell a product is protected by free speech consid-
erations, other publicity rights claims may go forward unimpeded 
by constitutional constraints.226 Finally, there is another set of dis-
putes involving efforts to constrain demonstrations—sometimes by 
people uttering or displaying horribly-phrased insults—near abor-
tion clinics, churches, funerals and other events or spaces. The 
Court’s reluctance to limit such demonstrations creates further 
tension with privacy doctrine. It is not at all clear that these lines of 
cases either can or should be reconciled, but I’ll do the best I can to 
trace my way through the disorder. 
1. Name Revelation Cases 
The classic name revelation case is Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn,227 decided in 1975. Six students from Sandy Springs High 
School, in a suburb north of Atlanta, were charged with the rape 
and murder of Cynthia Cohn, the seventeen-year-old daughter of 
Martin Cohn. A Georgia statute established a privacy norm by 
making the publication or broadcast of the name of a rape victim a 
                                                                                                                            
225 See infra Part III.D.1. 
226 For a general overview of cases and literature in the area, see Dora Georgescu, Two 
Tests Unite to Resolve the Tension Between the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 907 (2014). 
227 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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misdemeanor.228 The state also had a common law privacy tort, 
including claims for unlawful disclosure of private information.229 
The student defendants appeared in court on April 10, 1972. Tom 
Wassell was assigned by WSB-TV in Atlanta to cover the event. 
He sat through most of the proceedings in which five of the six de-
fendants pled guilty to rape in return for dismissal of the murder 
charges they faced. The other defendant’s trial was put over to a 
later date. During the hearing, various statements were made by 
the parties and prosecutors revealing the name of the victim. In ad-
dition, Wassell approached the clerk sitting in front of the bench 
during a recess and asked to see the indictments. The clerk com-
plied with the request, making no effort to conceal information 
about the identity of Ms. Cohn. As a result, her name was learned 
by Wassell and then mentioned during a television broadcast a bit 
later.230 Her father filed suit against Wassell and Cox Broadcasting 
Corp., the television station owner.231 
Justice White, writing for the Court, was careful in the way he 
described the case. 
[W]e should recognize that we do not have at issue 
here an action for the invasion of privacy involving 
the appropriation of one’s name or photograph, a 
physical or other tangible intrusion into a private 
area, or a publication of otherwise private informa-
                                                                                                                            
228 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972) then provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any news media or any other person to print 
and publish, broadcast, televise, or disseminate through any other 
medium of public dissemination or cause to be printed and published, 
broadcast, televised, or disseminated in any newspaper, magazine, 
periodical or other publication published in this State or through any 
radio or television broadcast originating in the State the name or 
identity or any female who may have been raped or upon whom an 
assault with intent to commit rape may have been made. Any person 
or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall, upon 
conviction, be punished as for a misdemeanor. 
The section was later codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-23, but was invalidated by the 
Georgia court in Dye v. Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 2001). 
229 Georgia may have been the first state to declare the existence of a range of common 
law privacy torts. The most famous case is Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 
S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), decided in the same era New York declined to move in that direction. 
230 See Cox, 420 U.S. at 472–74. 
231 See id. at 474. 
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tion that is also false although perhaps not defama-
tory. The version of the privacy tort now before 
us—termed in Georgia the tort of public disclo-
sure—is that in which the plaintiff claims the right 
to be free from unwanted publicity about his private 
affairs, which, although wholly true, would be offen-
sive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Because the 
gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of 
information, whether true or not, the dissemination 
of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an 
individual, it is here that claims of privacy most di-
rectly confront the constitutional freedoms of 
speech and press.232 
Confronting potentially conflicting privacy and free speech 
claims with long-standing doctrinal support, the Court balanced 
the relevant interests. It rejected efforts by the defendants to privi-
lege truthful commentary or to impose on the plaintiff high-level 
intention requirements like those operating in defamation and false 
light cases. Instead, while recognizing the importance of the values 
protected by Georgia’s victim-anonymity statute, Justice White 
noted three factors that required barring Cohn’s tort claim in this 
particular case. First, in spite of the rape victim protection statute, 
public officials revealed Cynthia Cohn’s identity to the press and 
handed over the indictments for perusal by a reporter.233 In the ab-
sence of bureaucratic efforts to protect privacy, it was hard to take 
Georgia’s victim protection policy very seriously.234 Second, the 
parties revealing the information to the general public were the 
most “saintly” for First Amendment purposes—traditional media 
outlets long cloaked in a constitutional mantle.235 Finally, the in-
formation Wassell revealed was about a regionally notorious case 
and therefore was a matter of public interest and importance.236 
Once public officials revealed the victim’s identity, television sta-
                                                                                                                            
232 Id. at 489. 
233 Id. at 492–93. 
234 The Court referred to the Restatement (Second) privacy provisions, see supra note 
153, and noted that they probably did not protect claims after information was revealed to 
the public. See 420 U.S. at 493–94. 
235 Id. 
236 See id. 
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tions and newspapers could pass that information on to the world 
at large. 
In many ways, the result is unattractive. In an era when rape 
victims often were shamed as much or more than the perpetrators 
of the crime, the Georgia privacy scheme made enormous sense. 
Today, the cultural proclivity to victimize the victim may have 
eased, though many surely would claim to the contrary. But for 
purposes of this Article, two aspects of the result in Cox strongly 
suggest that Svenson may not claim the same privilege as Wassell 
or Cox: Svenson neither replicated the role of the press in Cox, nor 
revealed information about a matter of public importance. 
First, reconsider the impact of Justice White’s opinion by 
changing the facts a bit. Suppose Martin Cohn had sued the prose-
cutor and court clerk—the parties who first revealed the identity of 
his daughter to Wassell. That significantly changes the nature and 
context of the privacy inquiry. Rather than worrying about the First 
Amendment protections surrounding the revelation of information 
by traditional media to the general public, this new case considers 
only the relationship between parties holding privacy rights and 
those who directly intrude upon them. There is an information 
chain from victim identification by the coroner, to police, to prose-
cuting authorities, to court officials, and finally to media. At some 
point the link to unlawful privacy intrusion may break. Perhaps, as 
the Cox court suggested, members of the press and TV media are 
the proper break-point.237 But freeing them from liability, as the 
Court did, does not relieve actors further back in the communica-
tion chain from liability for invasion of privacy. Indeed, strong ar-
guments may be made that the actors originally breaching Cohn’s 
privacy should be responsible for the harm caused by the media 
even if media outlets themselves are not financially responsible. 
There is an analogous information chain in the Foster/Svenson 
dispute. It runs from the Foster family and their appropriated mo-
ments, to Svenson, to the Julie Saul Gallery, and finally to the me-
dia covering the show. While a media outlet or academic author 
publishing images from the exhibition in magazines or newspapers, 
displaying them on TV broadcasts, or placing them online may be 
                                                                                                                            
237 See id. at 496. 
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protected by a First Amendment privilege similar to that operating 
in Cox, those earlier in the information chain do not operate in the 
same context. The photographer and gallery are the parties enabl-
ing the publication of otherwise private images. In fact, the publica-
tion of the information in the general media and online, as already 
noted, exacerbated the impact of the original intrusion. Svenson 
and the Saul Gallery are analogous to the prosecutors and court 
clerk in Cox, not to Wassell and his TV station. In short, nothing in 
Justice White’s opinion commands releasing Svenson and the Julie 
Saul Gallery from liability for appropriating private moments. They 
do not sit in the shoes of the press. 
In addition, information revealed by displaying photographs of 
the Fosters in a gallery was not of any public interest. While it may 
have taken on qualities of importance after the media got wind of 
the story and spread knowledge of it widely around the world, that 
was not so when Svenson took his pictures and first hung them in a 
gallery. The pictures were artistic to be sure, but they were not 
cloaked with the typical aura surrounding general media discourse 
about important public events. Consider some analogous cases, 
none of which are typically thought to raise serious First Amend-
ment problems. If a gallery displays a picture that infringes the 
copyright of another work, it may be compelled to remove it and 
pay damages for its public presentation. If a gallery displays a pic-
ture invading a famous person’s publicity rights, it may be com-
pelled to take it down. If a gallery hangs a picture that is stolen 
property it may be compelled to turn it over to the proper owner. 
The First Amendment extends to an artist the general privilege of 
creating a work, but only if some other interest of importance is not 
violated.238 Similarly, Svenson has a right to take and display pho-
tographs, but only if in doing so he does not violate the substantive 
rights of others.239 
                                                                                                                            
238 A book, for example, may be suppressed or the author forced to pay damages in a 
defamation case. 
239 There are three other well known cases that follow the basic structure of Cox. First, 
Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524 (1989), involved another rape victim identification. 
Here, too, in the teeth of a Florida statute barring use of a rape victim’s identity in the 
media, public officials revealed an identity. The Supreme Court barred suit against a 
newspaper that published the name.  
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2. Publicity Rights and the First Amendment 
When the Fosters first sought preliminary injunction relief 
from the New York courts, their right of publicity claim was dis-
missed on First Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court of New 
York opined: 
Plaintiffs cannot establish a likelihood of success 
on the merits. Defendant’s photos are protected by 
the First Amendment in the form of art and there-
fore shielded from New York’s Civil Rights 
Law . . . . Through the photos, Defendant is com-
municating his thoughts and ideas to the public. 
Additionally, they serve more than just an advertis-
ing or trade purpose because they promote the en-
joyment of art in the form of a displayed exhibition. 
The value of artistic expression outweighs any sale 
that stems from the published photos. 
Further, since the art is protected by the First 
Amendment, any advertising that is undertaken in 
connection with promoting that art is permitted. 
Defendant and the art gallery used Plaintiff’s photos 
to advertise The Neighbors; and the advertising is 
beyond the limits of the statute because it related to 
the protected exhibition itself. Further, The Neigh-
bors exhibition is a legitimate news item because cul-
tural attractions are matters of public and consumer 
interest. Therefore, news agencies and television 
networks are entitled to use Defendant’s photo-
graphs of Plaintiffs, which have a direct relationship 
to the news items—the photos are the focus of the 
newsworthy content.240 
                                                                                                                            
 The two other cases, Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) 
and See; Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), involved the revelation of 
names of juvenile court defendants. In both cases, identities were discovered via official 
channels. In one case, reporters were allowed to attend a court proceeding. Oklahoma 
Publ’g, 430 U.S. at 309. In the other, names were obtained by monitoring police radio 
channels. Smith, 443 U.S. at 99. Seeking relief from the media was barred in both cases.  
240 Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 
2013) (internal citations omitted). 
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The Appellate Division affirmed this result using very similar 
language.241 New York courts have consistently construed the state 
Civil Rights law to allow use of the likeness or identity of a person 
to report on newsworthy or publicly important events related to the 
likeness or identity, including art exhibitions.242 They also have 
studiously declined to create any types of privacy claims other than 
now traditional publicity rights actions brought to bar use of a per-
son’s identity to sell a product.243 So the court’s approach is se-
verely limited by its unwillingness to think about intrusions, and 
the consequences of intrusions, as part of its analysis. The overall 
conclusion that the Fosters’ claims are weak as a matter of New 
York state law, therefore, is theoretically challengeable but legally 
understandable. Nonetheless, the First Amendment analysis is du-
bious. By conflating the limitations of state law and constitutional 
analysis, the opinion ends up being deeply flawed. Even if intrusive 
privacy torts are not recognized in New York, that does not mean 
that the impact of intrusive behavior may also be ignored for First 
Amendment purposes. If an intrusion privacy tort was available to 
the Fosters in New York, there is no obvious reason why it would 
not frustrate Svenson’s desire to appropriate their private mo-
ments. That is made quite clear by a number of publicity rights 
claims decided over the years. Two are seminal enough to make 
them appropriate candidates for discussion here—Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.244 and ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publish-
ing Inc.245 
For decades, the Zacchini family participated in “thrill” shows 
where various kin were shot out of a cannon into a net some dis-
tance away.246 During August and September of 1972, family mem-
bers took flight daily at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. In 
late August, Hugo Zacchini noticed that a reporter was shooting 
movies of the act. He asked that filming cease, but under orders 
                                                                                                                            
241 Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 160–63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
242 See supra note 154. 
243 See supra note 154. 
244 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
245 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
246 For an old newsreel of one of their shows, see Weird Reels, Human 
Cannonball―Zacchini the Modern Münchhausen, YOUTUBE (Apr. 14, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EuTzWPJ73vY [https://perma.cc/JH7E-UQ4V]. 
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from those running WKYC in Cleveland, filming continued. On 
September 1, the entire fifteen-second act was broadcast on the 
11:00 PM news show.247 Zacchini then sued, claiming unlawful ap-
propriation of the cannon shot act and seeking damages for its use. 
The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment 
protected the actions of the TV news station and that Zacchini’s 
claim therefore must be dismissed.248 The United States Supreme 
Court took the case to decide whether the First Amendment privi-
leged the actions of WKYC.249 
The Court declined to exempt the cannon shot broadcast from 
tort liability. Justice White, writing for a slim 5–4 majority, opined 
that WKYC was free to verbally report on the cannon shot, as well 
as review and comment on it,250 but broadcasting the entire shot 
was another matter. While false light or defamation tort rules pro-
tected the reputation of the victim and therefore were likely to in-
volve media presentation of information about an important event, 
publicity rights protected “the proprietary interest of the individu-
al in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.”251 Intrusion 
into such a propriety interest, just like infringement of a copyright, 
might give rise to a cause of action without limitation because of 
any policy embedded in the First Amendment.252 
In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc.,253 Rick Rush254 made a 
painting called The Masters of Augusta containing three different 
images of Tiger Woods standing in front of the clubhouse at Au-
gusta National, the site the Masters Golf Tournament.255★ The 
                                                                                                                            
247 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563–64. 
248 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976). 
249 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565. 
250 Id. at 569–70, 575. 
251 Id. at 573. 
252 See id. 569–70. 
253 332 F.3d 915 (2003). 
254 See About Rick, RICK RUSH ART, http://www.rickrushart.com/about-rick-rush/ 
[http://perma.cc/NQE9-3BBM] (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). The Masters of Augusta is 
still available for purchase on this site. See The Masters of Augusta, RICK RUSH ART, 
http://www.rickrushart.com/new-products-2/the-masters-of-augusta [http://perma.cc/
R24C-LMSA] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
255★ The image is available at Richard H. Chused, Tiger Woods Painting, APPROPRIATE(D) 
MOMENTS, http://www.rhchused.com/Moments20.html [http://perma.cc/NA4V-QN
JH] (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
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work celebrated Woods’s victory at the Masters in 1997, when he 
set a tournament scoring record en route to becoming the youngest 
person ever to win the championship. After completing the work, 
Rush made editions of a print version for sale to the general public 
with Jireh’s assistance. Woods’ licensing agent, ETW Corp., then 
sued claiming violation of his publicity rights.256 Rush’s publisher, 
Jireh, claimed that the First Amendment protected the artist’s 
right to distribute the work in a variety of formats. The Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decided the dispute in Jireh’s favor and the-
reby allowed Rush to continue licensing items to Jireh for sale.257 
In combination, Zacchini and Jireh create an understandable 
and reasonable logical structure about the relationships between 
the First Amendment and the right of publicity. If, as in Zacchini, a 
personality-based product is used by another without consent for 
commercial purposes or the use of the name or likeness of a public 
person is used without consent in a way that leads reasonable view-
ers to think that the person endorses a product, then state law may 
step in without inhibition from the First Amendment. If, however, 
a public personality attempts to limit discussion of or writing about 
their lives, to inhibit the use of their likeness or personality for ar-
tistic purposes, or to control the way media or authors describe 
them to the public, the First Amendment will preclude such ef-
forts. In the most obvious cases, the transformative use of a perso-
nality by those using arenas classically protected by the First 
Amendment will be approved. As framed by the Jireh court, 
[W]e conclude that Ohio would construe its right of 
publicity as suggested in the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition, . . . which articulates a rule 
analogous to the rule of fair use in copyright law. 
Under this rule, the substantiality and market effect 
of the use of the celebrity’s image is analyzed in 
                                                                                                                            
256 The publicity right claim was joined with a number of others—trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act, dilution of the mark under the Lanham Act, unfair 
competition and false advertising under the Lanham Act, and unfair competition and 
deceptive trade practices under Ohio law. Only the publicity rights claim is of interest 
here. As in Zacchini, Ohio law became the focus of attention. ETW was incorporated in 
Ohio and claimed that state’s publicity rights rules were violated by Jireh. ETW Corp., 
332 F.3d at 919. 
257 Id. at 938. 
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light of the informational and creative content of the 
defendant’s use. Applying this rule, we conclude 
that Rush’s work has substantial and creative con-
tent which outweighs any adverse effect on ETW’s 
market and that Rush’s work does not violate 
Woods’s right of publicity.258 
In short, just as First Amendment considerations are deeply 
embedded in the meaning and use of the fair use rule in Copyright 
law, so too does publicity rights doctrine operating at its best have 
the equivalent of a fair use notion built into its structure. The fair 
use literature and case law is vast and complex, but for purposes of 
this Article, a simplified statement of the doctrine will suffice. Fair 
use allows any of us to employ materials protected by copyright if 
our new use is transformative and doesn’t negatively affect the 
market for the original work.259 Application of the rule is intensely 
fact-based and contextual. Similarly as publicity rights, the trans-
formative use of a person’s likeness will be permissible if it doesn’t 
have a negative impact on the ability of the public person to market 
themselves for endorsements or other remunerative purposes. Or, 
put another way, publicity rights operate to limit our ability to un-
fairly use the personality of another for our own commercial pur-
poses. 
That makes the results in Zacchini and Jireh both understanda-
ble and subject to disputation. That is not unusual in areas like fair 
use where the rule is vaguely stated and open to multiple interpre-
tations.260 The Zacchini shot certainly was worthy of some minimal 
                                                                                                                            
258 Id. at 937. 
259 The fair use case law is enormous. It is impossible to accurately summarize it in one 
sentence. Courts, when balancing the fair use factors listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2014), 
tend to focus on the interactions between the creative ways authors use prior material and 
the impact such use will have on the market for the protected work. A good example is 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The Court concluded that a 2 Live 
Crew rap song entitled “Pretty Woman” was a permissible parody of the Roy Orbison 
song “Oh, Pretty Woman.” For a parody to work, it must refer to the prior work. In 
addition, authors are unlikely to make fun of their own creative efforts and parodies are 
unlikely to have any impact on the market for the original. As a result, the transformations 
wrought by a parody often are treated as fair use. 
260 That the world of intellectual property law survived reasonably intact despite the 
vagaries of fair use law suggests that nothing terrible will result from use of a highly fact-
based, contextual law of privacy intrusion. 
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attention on a local news program. The Supreme Court said as 
much.261 But that does not mean it was appropriate to display the 
entire act if that action might both increase the audience for the 
news program and reduce the size of the audience trooping to the 
county fair to see the cannon shot. While such an economic effect, 
and therefore the Court’s decision, is subject to question, the un-
derlying approach is not. Similarly, it might well be that the impact 
of Rush’s paintings was quite different from the television display 
of the cannon shot. In contrast to the potential negative impact on 
the size of the thrill’s market, Rush’s work may have had no im-
pact on Wood’s ability to market his likeness by licensing and sell-
ing photographs of his choice. And though Rush might have used 
Woods’ fame to attract buyers, his artistic talents, even if deemed 
minimal, provided added context to justify the court’s result. I am 
not suggesting that disagreement with both outcomes is untenable. 
Quite the contrary is true. The broadcast of the cannon shot may 
actually have increased the value of Zacchini’s act and the sale of 
Rush’s work may have decreased the ability of Woods to market 
works displaying him in action. But the methodology used in these 
and many other publicity rights cases makes a great deal of 
sense.262 
So what does this all mean for the Foster case? Most important-
ly, the cases suggest that in arenas like publicity rights and privacy, 
context is critically important in analyzing First Amendment cases. 
When either commercial viability or intrusive behavior is under 
discussion, concern about the ability of media to freely discuss mat-
ters of pubic importance declines in importance. Rather than im-
pose high-level intention requirements as in defamation and false 
light cases, it is appropriate to balance an array of contextual fac-
tors before resolving disputes. In short, if New York wished to 
create a common law rule protecting the privacy interests of the 
Fosters, it could do so as long as the context suggested that Sven-
son’s artistic impulses violated some strong social policy. That, of 
course, is exactly what may have occurred here. 
                                                                                                                            
261 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977). 
262 It’s also worth noting that both Zacchini and Jireh, went up on appeal after trial court 
decisions on summary judgment (Zacchini lost on summary judgment, while Rush won). 
The actual market impact, therefore, was never litigated in either case. 
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3. Demonstration Cases 
The Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas may be the 
most despised religious organization in the nation. Among other 
things, the church’s members believe the United States is being 
punished for its tolerance of homosexuality.263 Those who died on 
9/11, in Iraq, and in other national endeavors were simply being 
punished for the wayward politics of their nation.264 The funeral of 
Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, killed on March 3, 2006 in a ve-
hicle accident while serving in Iraq, therefore became a target for 
the church’s odium. A week after his death, Westboro’s pastor 
Fred Phelps, now deceased,265 members of his family, and other 
congregants picketed the funeral proceedings—one of tens of thou-
sands of demonstrations they have held at funerals, churches, and 
other events and locations since 1991. As is evident in a photograph 
of the event,266★ the St. John Catholic Church in Westminster, 
Maryland where the funeral mass was held was surrounded by sup-
porters of the family, many carrying American flags, while the 
Westboro congregants carrying their obnoxious signs were con-
fined to a small area about one-thousand feet away. 
Albert Snyder, Matthew’s father, sued seeking damages for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion on seclusion, 
among other claims. After he obtained a five-million dollar award in 
a federal diversity action, the Supreme Court reversed and dis-
missed the claim.267 Two factors were critical in the decision on the 
emotional distress claim—the public nature of the Westboro 
Church claims about American society, and the location of the 
demonstration on public land some distance away from the funer-
                                                                                                                            
263 The church’s website makes their belief structure painfully clear. See God Hates 
Fags, WESTBORO BAPTIST CHURCH, http://www.godhatesfags.com/wbcinfo/about
wbc.html [http://perma.cc/VR2Z-6W3A] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
264 See FAQ, WESTBORO BAPTIST CHURCH, http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html 
[http://perma.cc/J7UT-NQ6G] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
265 Phelps died in 2014, but surviving members of his family carry on. See Michael 
Paulson, Fred Phelps, Anti-Gay Preacher Who Targeted Military Funerals, Dies at 84, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2014, at A26. 
266★ One picture is at Richard H. Chused, Snyder Funeral, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, 
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments21.html [http://perma.cc/UD2H-RLW6] (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2015). 
267 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459 (2011). 
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al.268 In combination, those factors bestowed a First Amendment 
privilege on the demonstration.269 Though the Court has construed 
the meaning of a matter of public concern broadly to include “any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,”270 
there was little doubt that the Westboro demonstration fell within 
the category. The funeral ritual itself certainly was private, but 
Phelps’s church was a well-known and widely discussed entity. 
The mere fact that supporters of the Snyder family gathered at St. 
John Catholic Church to counteract the hate speech of Westboro 
confirmed the public nature of the event. In addition, the use of 
public land, the lack of any shouting or insulting language by the 
Phelps supporters, and the distance of the picketing from the fu-
neral all suggested that additional time, place, or manner limita-
tions on the event probably were unnecessary. In short, the context 
of the event made it very difficult to avoid the application of tradi-
tional First Amendment doctrine to bar the imposition of penalties 
on the Westboro members.271 
The intrusion on seclusion tort fell by the wayside for similar 
reasons. Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, noted those dislik-
ing obnoxious speech on matters of public concern are asked to 
avoid listening to it.272 Only in rare instances have the Justices ap-
proved ordinances limiting speech because the audience is “cap-
tive.” Examples include, “a statute allowing a homeowner to re-
strict delivery of offensive mail to his home, and an ordinance pro-
hibiting picketing ‘before or about’ any individual’s residence.”273 
As with the name disclosure and publicity rights cases, Snyder 
does not limit the ability to create a tort for the benefit of the Fos-
ters. Certainly the surreptitious taking of photographs of those in 
                                                                                                                            
268 Id. at 455, 457. 
269 Id. at 458. 
270 Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1883)). 
271 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 458 (“Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on 
a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First 
Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses 
contempt.”). 
272 Id. at 459 (“Rather . . . the burden normally falls upon the viewer to avoid further 
ombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.”) (quoting Erznoznik v. 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–211 (1975)). 
273 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 459 (internal citations omitted). 
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their homes is not a matter of general public concern. Quite the 
contrary is true. Indeed, Justice Roberts suggested that when at 
home, occupants are in a sense “captive”—lacking the ability to 
evade offensive behavior by those operating in close proximity to 
the shelter.274 Nor did the picture taking occur in an area tradition-
ally viewed as a public forum. Again, quite the contrary is true. An 
open window does not a First Amendment public forum make. 
While commenting on voyeurism carries free speech attributes, 
acting as a voyeur may justifiably be thought of in a different 
breath. 
CONCLUSION 
It should not surprise anyone that the secret taking and public 
display of photographs of people quietly going about their lives at 
home would offend many. While I would expect that any debate 
over expansion of privacy doctrine to cover such matters would be 
contentious, it is no longer possible for us to ignore the intrusive 
qualities of digital technology. Perhaps this article will stimulate 
discussion on the issues. That alone would make my authorship of 
it worth the effort. The best way to conclude is simply to ask you to 
look at a view from my apartment balcony on a beautiful moonlit 
evening in New York City and to wonder what people across the 
street might be doing.275★ 
                                                                                                                            
274 Id. 
275★ Go to Richard H. Chused, Apartment View, APPROPRIATE(D) MOMENTS, 
http://www.rhchused.com/Moments22.html [http://perma.cc/YCX9-R6V4] (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
